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Abstract
This paper investigates rationalizable implementation of social choice functions
(SCFs) in incomplete information environments. We identify weak interim ratio-
nalizable monotonicity (weak IRM) as a novel condition and show that weak IRM
is a necessary and almost sufficient condition for rationalizable implementation.
We show by means of an example that interim rationalizable monotonicity (IRM),
found in the literature, is strictly stronger than weak IRM as its name suggests,
and that IRM is not necessary for rationalizable implementation, as had been pre-
viously claimed. The same example also demonstrates that Bayesian monotonicity,
the key condition for full Bayesian implementation, is not necessary for rationaliz-
able implementation. This implies that rationalizable implementation can be more
permissive than Bayesian implementation: one can exploit the fact that there are
no mixed Bayesian equilibria in the implementing mechanism.
JEL Classification: C72, D78, D82.
Keywords: Bayesian incentive compatibility, Bayesian monotonicity, weak interim
rationalizable monotonicity, interim rationalizable monotonicity, implementation,
rationalizability.
1 Introduction
A leading solution concept in game theory is rationalizability (Bernheim (1984), Pearce
(1984), Brandenburger and Dekel (1987), Lipman (1994)). When players are rational
and there is common belief among them that this is the case, they must find themselves
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playing rationalizable strategies, without necessarily imposing the additional assumption
that their beliefs are correct, as is the case in an equilibrium.1 Its extension to incomplete
information, our concern in this paper, is the notion of interim correlated rationalizability,
due to Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007), which will be defined in a later section.2
Despite the impressive effort made by implementation theorists in the 1980’s and
1990’s, using a plethora of game-theoretic solution concepts, a characterization of the
rules that are implementable in rationalizable strategies under incomplete information has
remained an open problem. The current paper settles this issue, by essentially providing
such a characterization, for the case of single-valued rules or social choice functions (SCFs).
A previous working paper (Bergemann and Morris (2008)) provides valuable results for
the case of finite mechanisms.3
Our main finding is to propose a novel condition, which we term weak interim rational-
izable monotonicity (weak IRM), that is necessary and almost sufficient for implementa-
tion in interim rationalizable strategies – Theorems 4.5 and 6.3. Weak IRM is a weakening
of the interim rationalizable monotonicity (IRM) condition proposed in Bergemann and
Morris (2008), which will be shown not to be necessary for rationalizable implementation
(Example 7.1). We stress this point because Oury and Tercieux (2012) makes an incorrect
claim that IRM is necessary for interim rationalizable implementation in their footnote
4. IRM – but not weak IRM – implies Bayesian monotonicity, a necessary condition for
implementation in Bayesian equilibrium (Lemma 5.8).4 Indeed, we show in Example 7.1
that weak IRM can be satisfied even when Bayesian monotonicity fails. Our results thus
1Some authors refer to the former property as “common knowledge of rationality” and to the latter
as the “rational-expectations assumption.” We remain neutral about such issues of terminology.
2Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) defines ∆-rationalizability by imposing extra restrictions on the first-
order beliefs, and Battigalli et al. (2011) shows that (a suitably defined) ∆-rationalizability is equivalent
to interim correlated rationalizability.
3Important related answers were previously given for the case of virtual or approximate implementation
(Abreu and Matsushima (1992)), with its robust counterparts (Bergemann and Morris (2009), Artemov,
Kunimoto, and Serrano (2013) – the latter paper using ∆-rationalizability). The different conclusions
reached in Bergemann and Morris (2009) and Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2013) can be traced
back to the different results in the two papers by Serrano and Vohra (2001, 2005), explained by the
issue of negligibility of types that cannot be distinguished by their interim preferences. A recent paper –
Kunimoto and Saran (2020) – studies the robust version of the implementation notion we use here.
4Oury and Tercieux (2012) are mainly concerned with continuous partial Bayesian implementation.
They show that if an SCF is strictly continuously partially Bayesian implementable, then it must satisfy
IRM. It follows from our results that strict continuous partial Bayesian implementation is even more
difficult than interim rationalizable implementation. Di Tillio (2011) shows that continuous interim
implementation in rationalizable strategies is not more demanding than interim rationalizable implemen-
tation when the designer is restricted to use finite mechanisms. That is, if a finite mechanism implements
an SCF in interim rationalizable strategies, then the same mechanism continuously implements the SCF
in interim rationalizable strategies. It remains an open question whether Di Tillio’s result extends to
infinite mechanisms, such as the canonical mechanism that we construct to prove our sufficiency result.
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demonstrate that rationalizable implementation may be more permissive than equilibrium
implementation.
The finding just described, that making the assumption of equilibrium or correct ex-
pectations may be restricting the set of rules that can be decentralized by means of play
in mechanisms, ought to be compared to results in complete information environments.
In contrast to our finding, Bergemann, Morris, and Tercieux (2011) and Xiong (2018)
show that rationalizable implementation of SCFs under complete information is more
restrictive than equilibrium implementation. For set-valued rules, however, Kunimoto
and Serrano (2019) come to the reverse conclusion that rationalizable implementation is
generally more permissive than equilibrium implementation under complete information.5
For general correspondences, Kunimoto and Serrano (2019) identifies uniform monotonic-
ity, which is a weakening of the classic Maskin Monotonicity (Maskin (1999)) and which
reduces to it in the case of SCFs, as a necessary and almost sufficient condition for ratio-
nalizable implementation. Since Maskin monotonicity is necessary and almost sufficient
for Nash implementation, regardless of whether one wishes to implement SCFs or gen-
eral correspondences, finding rules that are Nash implementable but not implementable
in rationalizable strategies is generally very difficult: such rules are Maskin monotonic,
which in addition to the other weak conditions identified in Kunimoto and Serrano (2019),
will also make them rationalizably implementable. On the other hand, it is easy to find
set-valued rules that are implementable in rationalizable strategies, but not in Nash equi-
librium. Our results show that the permissiveness of rationalizable implementation, in
comparison to equilibrium implementation, carries over to incomplete information en-
vironments but now even for SCFs.6 This happens if the implementing mechanism in
rationalizable strategies fails to have equilibria, showcasing the additional requirement of
the best-response correspondence having fixed points (Example 7.1 illustrates this point
well). We plan to generalize the findings in Kunimoto and Serrano (2019) as well as those
in the current study by a separate paper, posing the question of set-valued rules under
incomplete information.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents preliminaries. Section 3 intro-
duces our notion of implementation in interim rationalizable strategies. Weak IRM, as
the necessary condition for rationalizable strategies, is presented in Section 4. Section 5
relates weak IRM and IRM to previous conditions (Bayesian incentive compatibility and
Bayesian monotonicity). Section 6 shows that weak IRM and an additional weak condition
5See also Jain (2020), which follows the approach in Mezzetti and Renou (2012) of implementation
via supports.
6Kunimoto and Saran (2020) come to a similar conclusion for robust implementation.
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are sufficient for interim rationalizable implementation. Section 7 features our important
Example 7.1 to show that IRM and Bayesian monotonicity are not necessary for interim
rationalizable implementation, and Section 8 discusses the issues of finite mechanisms
and complete information environments. Section 9 concludes the paper with a few open
questions. Some proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries
Let I = {1, . . . , n} denote the finite set of agents and Ti be a finite set of types of agent
i. Let T ≡ T1 × · · ·× Tn, and T−i ≡ T1 × · · ·× Ti−1 × Ti+1 × · · ·× Tn.
7 Let ∆(T−i) denote
the set of probability distributions over T−i. Each agent i has a system of “interim”
beliefs that is expressed as a function πi : Ti → ∆(T−i). Then, we call (Ti, πi)i∈I a type
space. Let A denote a finite set of pure outcomes, which are assumed to be independent
of the information state. Let ∆(A) be the set of probability distributions over A. We let
∆∗(A) be any countable dense subset of ∆(A). Agent i’s state dependent von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function is denoted ui : ∆(A) × T → R. We can now define an
environment as E = (A, {ui, Ti, πi}i∈I).
A (stochastic) social choice function (SCF) is a single-valued function f : T → ∆(A).
Let T ∗ ⊆ T be such that
{t ∈ T : ∃i ∈ I s.t. πi(ti)[t−i] > 0} ⊆ T
∗.
We interpret T ∗ as the set of states the designer cares about. Consider any two SCFs
f, f
′
. We say that f and f
′
are equivalent (denoted by f ≈ f
′
) if f(t) = f
′
(t) for all
t ∈ T ∗.
A mechanism (or game form) Γ = ((Mi)i∈I , g) describes: (i) a nonempty countable
message space Mi for each agent i, and (ii) an outcome function g : M → ∆(A), where
M =
∏
i∈I Mi. Let Γ
DR = ((Ti)i∈I , f) denote the direct revelation mechanism associated
with an SCF f , i.e., a mechanism where Mi = Ti for all i and g = f .
In the direct revelation mechanism associated with an SCF f , the interim expected
utility of agent i of type ti who pretends to be of type t
′
i, while all other agents truthfully
announce their types, is defined as:
Ui(f ; t
′
i|ti) ≡
∑
t−i∈T−i
πi(ti)[t−i]ui
(
f(t′i, t−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
7Similar notation will be used for products of other sets.
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Let Ui(f |ti) = Ui(f ; ti|ti).
For any i ∈ I and function y : T−i → ∆(A), we define
Ui(y|ti) ≡
∑
t−i∈T−i
πi(ti)[t−i]ui
(
y(t−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
3 Implementation in Interim Rationalizable Strate-
gies
We adopt interim correlated rationalizability (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007)) as
a solution concept and investigate the implications of implementation in interim corre-
lated “rationalizable” strategies.8 We fix a mechanism Γ = (M, g) and define a message
correspondence profile S = (S1, . . . , Sn), where each Si : Ti → 2
Mi, and we write S for
the collection of message correspondence profiles. The collection S is a lattice with the
natural ordering of set inclusion: S ≤ S
′
if Si(ti) ⊆ S
′
i(ti) for all i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti. The
largest element is S̄ = (S̄1, . . . , S̄n), where S̄i(ti) = Mi for each i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti. The
smallest element is S = (S1, . . . , Sn), where Si(ti) = ∅ for each i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti.
We define an operator b to iteratively eliminate never best responses. The operator
b : S → S is thus defined as: for every i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti,
bi(S)[ti] ≡









mi :
∃λi ∈ ∆(T−i ×M−i) such that
(1) λi(t−i, m−i) > 0 ⇒ m−i ∈ S−i(t−i);
(2) margT−iλi = πi(ti);
(3) mi ∈ argmaxm′
i
∑
t−i,m−i
λi(t−i, m−i)ui(g(m
′
i, m−i), (ti, t−i))









.
Observe that b is increasing by definition: i.e., S ≤ S
′
⇒ b(S) ≤ b(S
′
). By Tarski’s
fixed-point theorem, there is a largest fixed point of b, which we label SΓ(T ). Thus, (i)
b(SΓ(T )) = SΓ(T ) and (ii) b(S) = S ⇒ S ≤ SΓ(T ).
We can also construct the fixed point SΓ(T ) by starting with S̄ – the largest element
of the lattice – and iteratively applying the operator b. Let the message correspondence
profile SΓ(T ),0 = S̄ and, for all i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, k ≥ 1, iteratively define,
S
Γ(T ),k
i (ti) ≡ bi
(
SΓ(T ),k−1
)
[ti].
8Unlike Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2007), we do not have the payoff-relevant state space separately
from the type space in our formulation of interim correlated rationalizability. We chose this specification
to be consistent with most of the papers on implementation in incomplete information environments.
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If the message sets are finite, we have
S
Γ(T )
i (ti) ≡
⋂
k≥0
S
Γ(T ),k
i (ti)
for each i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti. However, since the mechanism Γ may be infinite, transfinite
induction may be necessary to reach the fixed point. Thus, S
Γ(T )
i (ti) are the sets of
messages surviving (transfinite) iterated deletion of never best responses of type ti of
agent i.9 We denote by σi a selection from S
Γ(T )
i and call it a rationalizable strategy of
agent i. We recall the following structure of SΓ(T ):
SΓ(T ) =
∏
i∈I
S
Γ(T )
i .
Definition 3.1. A mechanism Γ implements an SCF f in interim rationalizable strategies
if there exists an SCF f̂ ≈ f such that the following two conditions hold:
1. Nonemptiness: S
Γ(T )
i (ti) 6= ∅ for all ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ I.
2. Uniqueness: for any t ∈ T , m ∈ SΓ(T )(t) implies g(m) = f̂(t).
Remark: The uniqueness requirement in interim rationalizable implementation is stronger
than the usual one, because we require that every rationalizable strategy profile induces
outcomes specified by the equivalent SCF f̂ over the entire T rather than T ∗. This
strengthening allows us to obtain a clean characterization for interim rationalizable im-
plementation.
We say that an SCF f is implementable in interim rationalizable strategies if there
exists a mechanism Γ that implements f in interim rationalizable strategies.
4 Necessity for Implementation of an SCF in Interim
Rationalizable Strategies
In this section, we uncover a necessary condition for interim rationalizable implementation
of an SCF. First, we turn to some preliminary definitions.
Definition 4.1. A deception is a profile of correspondences β = (β1, . . . , βn) such that
βi : Ti → 2
Ti \ ∅ and ti ∈ βi(ti) for all ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ I.
9For our necessity result, we require that S
Γ(T )
i (ti) 6= ∅ for all ti. For sufficiency, our implementing
mechanism has the same property.
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Remark: These set-valued deceptions have already been used in previous literature on
interim rationalizable implementation (Bergemenn and Morris (2008), Oury and Tercieux
(2012)). On the other hand, the requirement that ti ∈ βi(ti) for all ti is made to simplify
the writing of some steps in the proof below. It is not essential at all for our results.
Definition 4.2. A deception β is unacceptable for an SCF f if there exist t ∈ T and
t
′
∈ β(t) such that f(t) 6= f(t
′
); otherwise, β is acceptable for f .
Unacceptable deceptions are a concern for the designer since they undermine her goal
of implementing the outcome f(t) for any t ∈ T .
Given an SCF f , for each i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti, define
Yi[ti, f ] ≡
{
y : T−i → ∆(A) :
either y(ti, t−i) = f(ti, t−i), ∀t−i ∈ T−i
or Ui(f |ti) > Ui(y|ti)
}
.
Thus, Yi[ti, f ] is the collection of all mappings y : T−i → ∆(A) that individual i of type
ti considers to be “equivalent” to f or strictly worse than f .
For any SCF f and individual i ∈ I, we define a binary relation ∼fi on Ti × Ti as
follows: We say that ti ∼
f
i t
′
i if f is not responsive to this change in i’s type, i.e.,
f(ti, t−i) = f(t
′
i, t−i), ∀t−i ∈ T−i.
Otherwise, we say ti 6∼
f
i t
′
i. Notice that ∼
f
i is symmetric, that is, ti ∼
f
i t
′
i if and only if
t
′
i ∼
f
i ti. We say that an SCF f is unresponsive to agent i’s type if ti ∼
f
i t
′
i for all ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti.
Definition 4.3. A deception β that is unacceptable for an SCF f is weakly refutable if
there exist i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and t
′
i ∈ βi(ti) satisfying t
′
i 6∼
f
i ti such that for all ψi ∈ ∆(T−i×T )
satisfying ψi(t−i, t̃) > 0 ⇒ t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i) and πi(ti)[t−i] =
∑
t̃∈T ψi(t−i, t̃) for all t−i ∈ T−i,
there exists an SCF f
′
such that f
′
(t̃i, ·) ∈ Yi[t̃i, f ] for all t̃i ∈ Ti and
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f
′
(t̃), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f(t
′
i, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
Unlike equilibrium, the solution concept of rationalizability allows different types of
an agent to hold distinct beliefs about the behavior of the other agents. To illustrate
this while keeping matters simple, suppose for each type t̃j of each agent j we can find
a strategy profile σ
t̃j
−j such that σ
t̃j
−j(t−j) ∈ S
Γ(T )
−j (t−j), for all t−j, which rationalizes the
behavior of type t̃j (i.e., type t̃j has a rationalizable message that is a best response
to the belief that the other agents play according to the rationalizable strategy profile
σ
t̃j
−j). Now suppose that instead of reporting their own rationalizable messages, agents
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use the deception β (i.e., agents of types t̂ report rationalizable messages corresponding
to types in β(t̂)). When the deception β is weakly refutable, the designer finds an agent’s
type (type ti of agent i) as an ally to undermine the deception. Specifically, this type
finds a collection of SCFs, one for each belief ψi ∈ ∆(T−i × T ) that is compatible with
the fact that the other agents are using the deception β−i. Notice that the belief ψi is
defined over T−i × T rather than T−i × T−i because player i is aware that types t̂−i are
playing messages that are rationalizable for types β−i(t̂−i), which in turn rationalize the
behavior of different types of player i. Therefore, the rationalizable messages for types
β−i(t̂−i) could vary depending upon which type of player i’s behavior they rationalize. For
instance, σti−i(β−i(t̂−i)) ∈ S
Γ(T )
−i (β−i(t̂−i)) that rationalize the behavior of type ti of player
i might be different from σ
t
′
i
−i(β−i(t̂−i)) ∈ S
Γ(T )
−i (β−i(t̂−i)) that rationalize the behavior
of type t
′
i of player i. Thus, when contemplating the behavior of types t̂−i under the
deception β, player i needs to form a belief over messages in
⋃
t̃i∈Ti
{σt̃i−i(β−i(t̂−i))}, which
explains why the domain of ψi includes Ti as a component.
It is instructive to appreciate this feature of ψi in comparison with equilibrium im-
plementation in incomplete information environments. In equilibrium implementation in
incomplete information environments, such as Bayesian implementation, all players share
a common belief that one particular equilibrium strategy profile σ∗ is played in the mech-
anism. Then, when contemplating the behavior of types t̂−i under the deception β, player
i’s belief is simply that types t̂−i report σ
∗(β−i(t̂−i)), which is independent of player i’s
type.
The collection of SCFs that the ally finds to undermine the deception is required to
satisfy the following two properties. First, by definition, each type t̃i places each of these
SCFs f
′
in the strictly lower contour set of f under truth-telling whenever f
′
(t̃i, ·) 6=
f(t̃i, ·). Second, when the deception β is used, then under belief ψi, type ti strictly prefers
the corresponding SCF f
′
in the collection to f . If one insists on restricting the collection
of SCFs to those f
′
that are unresponsive to agent i’s type, then one would speak of
strong refutability. Under this restriction, there is a mapping y : T−i → ∆(A) such that
f
′
(t̃i, ·) = y for all t̃i. Then, the requirement that f
′
(t̃i, ·) ∈ Yi[t̃i, f ] for all t̃i ∈ Ti means
that y ∈
⋂
t̃i∈Ti
Yi[t̃i, f ]. This will be important to understand the difference with the
previous condition proposed in the literature. We discuss this in the next section.
Definition 4.4. An SCF f satisfies weak interim rationalizable monotonicity (weak IRM)
if every deception β that is unacceptable for f is weakly refutable.
If an SCF satisfies weak IRM, the designer can plan on using the services of the
ally identified in the definition of weak refutability in order to succeed in her attempt of
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implementing f . If she insisted on the deception being strongly refutable, then the SCF
would satisfy interim rationalizable monotonicity (IRM), a stronger condition introduced
in the literature (Bergemann and Morris (2008), Oury and Tercieux (2012)). In particular,
it is claimed in Oury and Tercieux (2012, footnote 4) that IRM is necessary for the interim
rationalizable implementation of SCFs. We will show this claim to be incorrect in the
sequel.
Next, we present our first main result, which shows that weak IRM is necessary for
implementation in rationalizable strategies:
Theorem 4.5. If an SCF f is implementable in interim rationalizable strategies, then
there exists an SCF f̂ ≈ f that satisfies weak IRM.
Proof. Suppose the mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈I , g) implements f in rationalizable strategies.
Then, there exists an SCF f̂ ≈ f such that
1. Nonemptiness: S
Γ(T )
i (ti) 6= ∅ for all ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ I.
2. Uniqueness: for any t ∈ T , m ∈ SΓ(T )(t) implies g(m) = f̂(t).
For any i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, we set m
ti
i ∈ S
Γ(T )
i (ti) (such a message m
ti
i exists by the nonempty-
ness requirement of implementability in interim rationalizable strategies). By the unique-
ness requirement,
f̂(t) = g(mt11 , . . . , m
tn
n ), ∀t ∈ T.
We now argue that f̂ satisfies weak IRM.
As mtii ∈ S
Γ(T )
i (ti), by the definition of rationalizable strategies, there exists a belief
λtii ∈ ∆(T−i ×M−i) such that margT−iλ
ti
i = πi(ti); λ
ti
i (t−i, m−i) > 0 ⇒ m−i ∈ S
Γ(T )
−i (t−i);
and
mtii ∈ arg max
mi∈Mi
∑
t−i,m−i
λtii (t−i, m−i)ui
(
g(mi, m−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
For each t−i such that πi(ti)[t−i] > 0, define the conditional distribution σ
ti
−i(t−i) ∈
∆(M−i) as follows: for any m−i ∈ M−i,
σti−i(t−i)[m−i] =
λtii (t−i, m−i)
πi(ti)[t−i]
.
For each t−i such that πi(ti)[t−i] = 0, let σ
ti
−i(t−i) ∈ ∆(M−i) denote the degenerate
distribution that puts probability one on m
t−i
−i , i.e., σ
ti
−i(t−i)[m
t−i
−i ] = 1. In either case,
σti−i(t−i)[m−i] > 0 ⇒ m−i ∈ S
Γ(T )
−i (t−i). This is true by construction if t−i is such that
πi(ti)[t−i] = 0; whereas if t−i is such that πi(ti)[t−i] > 0, then σ
ti
−i(t−i)[m−i] > 0 ⇒
λtii (t−i, m−i) > 0 ⇒ m−i ∈ S
Γ(T )
−i (t−i).
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Now for each mi ∈Mi, define y
mi,ti : T−i → ∆(A) as follows: for all t−i ∈ T−i,
ymi,ti(t−i) =
∑
m−i∈M−i
σti−i(t−i)[m−i]g(mi, m−i).
Since margT−iλ
ti
i = πi(ti), if πi(ti)[t−i] = 0, then λ
ti
i (t−i, m−i) = 0 for all m−i ∈ M−i.
Hence,
∑
t−i,m−i
λtii (t−i, m−i)ui
(
g(mi, m−i), (ti, t−i)
)
=
∑
t−i:πi(ti)[t−i]>0
∑
m−i
λtii (t−i, m−i)ui
(
g(mi, m−i), (ti, t−i)
)
(∵ πi(ti)[t−i] = 0 ⇒ λ
ti
i (t−i, m−i) = 0, ∀m−i)
=
∑
t−i:πi(ti)[t−i]>0
∑
m−i
πi(ti)[t−i]
λtii (t−i, m−i)
πi(ti)[t−i]
ui
(
g(mi, m−i), (ti, t−i)
)
=
∑
t−i:πi(ti)[t−i]>0
πi(ti)[t−i]
∑
m−i
σti−i(t−i)[m−i]ui
(
g(mi, m−i), (ti, t−i)
)
(
∵ σti−i(t−i)[m−i] =
λtii (t−i, m−i)
πi(ti)[t−i]
)
=
∑
t−i:πi(ti)[t−i]>0
πi(ti)[t−i]ui
(
ymi,ti(t−i), (ti, t−i)
)
(∵ by linearity of expected utility ui(·, (ti, t−i)))
= Ui(y
mi,ti|ti). (1)
Define the set
Li(ti) = {y
mi,ti : mi ∈Mi}.
Consider the message mtii set forth in the beginning of the proof. Recall that m
ti
i ∈
S
Γ(T )
i (ti). By the requirement of implementation and the fact that σ
ti
−i(t−i)[m−i] > 0 ⇒
m−i ∈ S
Γ(T )
−i (t−i), we get
ym
ti
i
,ti(t−i) = f̂(ti, t−i), ∀t−i ∈ T−i.
Therefore, the following is true for all mi ∈Mi:
Ui(f̂ |ti) = Ui(y
m
ti
i
,ti |ti) =
∑
t−i,m−i
λtii (t−i, m−i)ui
(
g(mtii , m−i), (ti, t−i)
)
≥
∑
t−i,m−i
λtii (t−i, m−i)ui
(
g(mi, m−i), (ti, t−i)
)
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= Ui(y
mi,ti |ti), (2)
where the second and last equalities follow from (1) and the weak inequality follows
because mtii is a best response of type ti against the belief λ
ti
i .
We now claim that if mi is such that y
mi,ti(t−i) 6= f̂(ti, t−i) for some t−i ∈ T−i, then it
must be that
Ui(f̂ |ti) > Ui(y
mi,ti |ti).
If the foregoing strict inequality were not true, then it would follow from (2) that
Ui(f̂ |ti) = Ui(y
mi,ti |ti)
⇒
∑
t−i,m−i
λtii (t−i, m−i)ui
(
g(mtii , m−i), (ti, t−i)
)
=
∑
t−i,m−i
λtii (t−i, m−i)ui
(
g(mi, m−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
Thus, mi would also be a best response of type ti against the belief λ
ti , and hence mi ∈
S
Γ(T )
i (ti). Then, by the requirement of implementation and the fact that σ
ti
−i(t−i)[m−i] >
0 ⇒ m−i ∈ S
Γ(T )
−i (t−i), we get
ymi,ti(t−i) = f̂(ti, t−i), ∀t−i ∈ T−i,
which is a contradiction. This establishes that the strict inequality above holds.
We are now ready to prove that f̂ satisfies weak IRM. Consider any deception β.
Define the message correspondence profile S = (S1, . . . , Sn) such that
Si(ti) =
⋃
t
′
i
∈βi(ti)
S
Γ(T )
i (t
′
i).
Suppose β is unacceptable for f̂ but not weakly refutable. Then, by definition of weak
refutability, for all i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and t
′
i ∈ βi(ti) satisfying t
′
i 6∼
f
i ti, there exists ψi ∈
∆(T−i×T ), which satisfies ψi(t−i, t̃) > 0 ⇒ t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i) and πi(ti)[t−i] =
∑
t̃∈T ψi(t−i, t̃)
for all t−i ∈ T−i, such that for all SCFs f
′
that satisfy f
′
(t̃i, ·) ∈ Yi[t̃i, f ] for all t̃i ∈ Ti, we
have
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f̂(t
′
i, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
≥
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f
′
(t̃), (ti, t−i)
)
(3)
We first show that for any i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and t
′
i ∈ βi(ti) satisfying t
′
i ∼
f̂
i ti, there
exists ψi ∈ ∆(T−i × T ), which satisfies ψi(t−i, t̃) > 0 ⇒ t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i) and πi(ti)[t−i] =
∑
t̃∈T ψi(t−i, t̃) for all t−i ∈ T−i, such that (3) holds for all SCFs f
′
that satisfy f
′
(t̃i, ·) ∈
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Yi[t̃i, f ] for all t̃i ∈ Ti.
Pick any i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and t
′
i ∈ βi(ti) satisfying t
′
i ∼
f̂
i ti. We set the belief ψi ∈
∆(T−i × T ) such that ψi(t−i, t̃) = 0 whenever either t̃i 6= ti or t̃−i 6= t−i and ψi(t−i, t̃) =
πi(ti)[t−i] whenever t̃i = ti and t̃−i = t−i. As t−i ∈ β−i(t−i), the belief ψi satisfies
ψi(t−i, t̃) > 0 ⇒ t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i). Moreover, πi(ti)[t−i] =
∑
t̃∈T ψi(t−i, t̃) for all t−i ∈ T−i.
Consider any SCF f
′
such that f
′
(t̃i, ·) ∈ Yi[t̃i, f ] for all t̃i ∈ Ti. Then
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f̂(t
′
i, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
=
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f̂(ti, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
= Ui(f̂ |ti)
≥ Ui(f
′
(ti, ·)|ti)
=
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f
′
(t̃), (ti, t−i)
)
,
where the first equality follows from the fact that t
′
i ∼
f̂
i ti, the second and last equalities
follow from the construction of the belief ψi, and the inequality follows from the fact that
f
′
(ti, ·) ∈ Yi[ti, f̂ ].
Thus, if we combine the above result with the hypothesis that β is not weakly refutable,
then we can hypothesize that for all i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and t
′
i ∈ βi(ti), there exists ψi ∈
∆(T−i×T ), which satisfies ψi(t−i, t̃) > 0 ⇒ t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i) and πi(ti)[t−i] =
∑
t̃∈T ψi(t−i, t̃)
for all t−i ∈ T−i, such that (3) holds for all SCFs f
′
that satisfy f
′
(t̃i, ·) ∈ Yi[t̃i, f ] for all
t̃i ∈ Ti.
10
We next show that b(S) ≥ S. Pick any i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and m
′
i ∈ Si(ti). We now
construct a belief λΓi ∈ ∆(T−i ×M−i) satisfying λ
Γ
i (t−i, m−i) > 0 implies m−i ∈ S−i(t−i)
and margT−iλ
Γ
i = πi(ti) such that m
′
i is a best response for agent i of type ti against λ
Γ
i .
By the definition of S, we have m
′
i ∈ S
Γ(T )
i (t
′
i) for some t
′
i ∈ βi(ti). Then, by our
hypothesis, there exists ψi ∈ ∆(T−i × T ), which satisfies ψi(t−i, t̃) > 0 ⇒ t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i)
and πi(ti)[t−i] =
∑
t̃∈T ψi(t−i, t̃) for all t−i ∈ T−i, such that (3) holds for all SCFs f
′
that
satisfy f
′
(t̃i, ·) ∈ Yi[t̃i, f ] for all t̃i ∈ Ti.
Define the belief λΓi ∈ ∆(T−i ×M−i) as follows: for any (t−i, m−i),
λΓi (t−i, m−i) =
∑
t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)× σ
t̃i
−i(t̃−i)[m−i].
By construction, λΓi (t−i, m−i) > 0 implies that there exists t̃ ∈ T such that ψi(t−i, t̃) > 0
and σt̃i−i(t̃−i)[m−i] > 0. But ψi(t−i, t̃) > 0 implies t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i). Moreover, σ
t̃i
−i(t̃−i)[m−i] >
10We are able to drop t
′
6∼f̂i ti as part of the qualification in the hypothesis.
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0 implies m−i ∈ S
Γ(T )
−i (t̃−i) – recall the definition of σ
t̃i
−i(t̃−i)[m−i] from the beginning of
this proof. Since t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i) and m−i ∈ S
Γ(T )
−i (t̃−i), it follows from the definition of S
that m−i ∈ S−i(t−i).
Again, by construction, for all t−i ∈ T−i,
margT−iλ
Γ
i (t−i) =
∑
m−i
λΓi (t−i, m−i) =
∑
t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃) = πi(ti)[t−i].
Thus, margT−iλ
Γ
i = πi(ti).
Pick any m̃i ∈ Mi and consider y
m̃i,t̃i as defined earlier in the proof. Now define
the SCF f m̃i such that f m̃i(t̃) = ym̃i,t̃i(t̃−i) for all t̃ ∈ T . Recall that if m̃i is such that
ym̃i,t̃i(t−i) 6= f̂(t̃i, t−i) for some t−i ∈ T−i, then it must be that Ui(f̂ |t̃i) > Ui(y
m̃i,t̃i |t̃i). So
f m̃i(t̃i, ·) = y
m̃i,t̃i ∈ Yi[t̃i, f̂ ] for all t̃i ∈ Ti. So inequality (3) holds for f
m̃i .
By the requirement of implementability, we have
f̂(t
′
i, t̃−i) =
∑
m−i∈M−i
σt̃i−i(t̃−i)[m−i]g(m
′
i, m−i), ∀t̃−i ∈ T−i.
We are ready to show that m
′
i is a best response for agent i of type ti against λ
Γ
i .
Consider any m̃i ∈ Mi. Then
∑
t−i,m−i
λΓi (t−i, m−i)ui
(
g(m
′
i, m−i), (ti, t−i)
)
=
∑
t−i,m−i
(
∑
t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)× σ
t̃i
−i(t̃−i)[m−i]ui
(
g(m
′
i, m−i), (ti, t−i)
)
)
(by definition of λΓi )
=
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)


∑
m−i
σt̃i−i(t̃−i)[m−i]ui
(
g(m
′
i, m−i), (ti, t−i)
)


=
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui


∑
m−i
σt̃i−i(t̃−i)[m−i]g(m
′
i, m−i), (ti, t−i)


(by linearity of expected utility ui(·, (ti, t−i)))
=
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f̂(t
′
i, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
(by the requirement of implementability of f̂)
≥
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f m̃i(t̃), (ti, t−i)
)
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(∵ inequality (3) holds for f m̃i)
=
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
ym̃i,t̃i(t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
(by definition of f m̃i)
=
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)


∑
m−i
σt̃i−i(t̃−i)[m−i]ui
(
g(m̃i, m−i), (ti, t−i)
)


(by definition of ym̃i,t̃i and linearity of expected utility ui(·, (ti, t−i)))
=
∑
t−i,m−i
λΓi (t−i, m−i)ui
(
g(m̃i, m−i), (ti, t−i)
)
(by definition of λΓi ).
Since m
′
i is a best response of player i of type ti against λ
Γ
i satisfying λ
Γ
i (t−i, m−i) >
0 ⇒ m−i ∈ S−i(t−i) and margT−iλ
Γ
i = πi(ti), it follows by definition that m
′
i ∈ bi(S)[ti].
As b(S) ≥ S, we have S ≤ SΓ(T ). Consider any t ∈ T and t
′
∈ β(t). Pick a
message profile mt
′
∈ SΓ(T )(t
′
) as defined in the beginning of the proof. By definition,
g(mt
′
) = f̂(t
′
). Now SΓ(T )(t
′
) ⊆ S(t) ⊆ SΓ(T )(t), where the first set inclusion follows
from the definition of the message correspondence profile S and the second set inclusion
follows from S ≤ SΓ(T ). Therefore, mt
′
∈ SΓ(T )(t). Hence, g(mt
′
) = f̂(t) by the uniqueness
requirement of implementation. Thus, f̂(t
′
) = f̂(t). So β is acceptable for f̂ , which is a
contradiction. This completes the proof.
5 Weak IRM, IRM, and Other Relevant Conditions
In this section, we investigate the connections between weak IRM, IRM, and the condi-
tions of incentive compatibility and Bayesian monotonicity, central in the characterization
of SCFs that are implementable in Bayesian equilibrium. Further connections will be un-
covered in a later section, after we state and prove our sufficiency result.
Definition 5.1. An SCF f satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) if for all i ∈ I
and ti ∈ Ti,
Ui(f |ti) ≥ Ui(f ; t
′
i|ti), ∀t
′
i ∈ Ti
If these constraints are strict whenever ti 6∼
f
i t
′
i, then we say that f satisfies strict-if-
responsive Bayesian incentive compatibility (SIRBIC).
Clearly, SIRBIC is a strenghthening of BIC, while it is a weakening of strict IC, which
imposes strict inequalities on all incentive constraints. Then, we can show the following:
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Lemma 5.2. If an SCF f satisfies weak IRM, then it satisfies SIRBIC.
Proof. Suppose the SCF f satisfies weak IRM. Fix i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti. Pick any t
′
i ∈ Ti. If
ti ∼
f
i t
′
i, then clearly Ui(f |ti) = Ui(f ; t
′
i|ti).
Next, suppose ti 6∼
f
i t
′
i. Consider the deception β such that βj(tj) = {tj} for all tj ∈ Tj
and j 6= i but
βi(t̃i) =
{
{ti, t
′
i}, if t̃i = ti
{t̃i}, otherwise.
Since ti 6∼
f
i t
′
i, the deception β is unacceptable for f . Hence, by weak IRM, it must
be weakly refutable. That is, there exist j ∈ I, t̂j ∈ Tj , and t̂
′
j ∈ βj(t̂j) satisfying
t̂
′
j 6∼
f
j t̂j such that for any ψj ∈ ∆(T−j × T ) satisfying ψj(t−j, t̃) > 0 ⇒ t̃−j ∈ β−j(t−j)
and πj(t̂j)[t−j] =
∑
t̃∈T ψj(t−j, t̃) for all t−j ∈ T−j, there exists an SCF f
′
such that
f
′
(t̃j , ·) ∈ Yj[t̃j , f ] for all t̃j ∈ Tj and
∑
t−j ,t̃
ψj(t−j, t̃)uj
(
f
′
(t̃), (t̂j , t−j)
)
>
∑
t−j ,t̃
ψj(t−j , t̃)uj
(
f(t̂
′
j, t̃−j), (t̂j , t−j)
)
.
Since t̂
′
j 6∼
f
j t̂j and t̂
′
j ∈ βj(t̂j), it must be that j = i, t̂j = ti and t̂
′
j = t
′
i.
Consider the belief ψi such that (i) ψi(t−i, t̃) = 0 whenever either t̃i 6= ti or t̃−i 6= t−i
and (ii) ψi(t−i, t̃) = πi(ti)[t−i] whenever t̃i = ti and t̃−i = t−i. As t−i ∈ β−i(t−i), the belief
ψi satisfies ψi(t−i, t̃) > 0 ⇒ t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i). Moreover, πi(ti)[t−i] =
∑
t̃∈T ψi(t−i, t̃) for all
t−i ∈ T−i. Hence, we must have some SCF f
′
such that f
′
(t̃i, ·) ∈ Yi[t̃i, f ] for all t̃i ∈ Ti
such that
Ui(f
′
|ti) =
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f
′
(t̃), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f(t
′
i, t−i), (ti, t−i)
)
= Ui(f ; t
′
i|ti).
But f
′
(ti, ·) ∈ Yi[ti, f ] implies that Ui(f |ti) ≥ Ui(f
′
|ti). Therefore, Ui(f |ti) > Ui(f ; t
′
i|ti),
which completes the proof.
As discussed in the previous section when we defined weak refutability, one can propose
a stronger notion of refutability.
Definition 5.3. A deception β that is unacceptable for an SCF f is strongly refutable if
there exist i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and t
′
i ∈ βi(ti) satisfying t
′
i 6∼
f
i ti such that for all ψi ∈ ∆(T−i×T )
satisfying ψi(t−i, t̃) > 0 ⇒ t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i) and πi(ti)[t−i] =
∑
t̃∈T ψi(t−i, t̃) for all t−i ∈ T−i,
there exists an SCF f
′
such that f
′
is unresponsive to agent i’s type, f
′
(t̃i, ·) ∈ Yi[t̃i, f ]
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for all t̃i ∈ Ti, and
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f
′
(t̃), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f(t
′
i, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
Remark: Note how the SCF f
′
in the statement for strong refutability is required to
be unresponsive to agent i’s type, as opposed to allowing f
′
that could respond to a
change in agent i’s type in the statement for weak refutability. This additional require-
ment for strong refutability, in conjunction with the stipulation that f
′
(t̃i, ·) ∈ Yi[t̃i, f ]
for all t̃i ∈ Ti, implies that there exists a mapping y ∈
⋂
t̃i∈Ti
Yi[t̃i, f ] that is strictly
preferred to f by type ti of agent i when the deception β is used. Interim rationalizable
monotonicity introduced by Bergemann and Morris (2008) requires the existence of such
mappings y ∈
⋂
t̃i∈Ti
Yi[t̃i, f ] in order to undermine unacceptable deceptions. Indeed, as
we show next, interim rationalizable monotonicity is equivalent to strong refutability of
every unacceptable deception.
Definition 5.4. An SCF f satisfies interim rationalizable monotonicity (IRM) if, for
every deception β that is unacceptable for f , there exist i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and t
′
i ∈ βi(ti)
satisfying t
′
i 6∼
f
i ti such that for all φi ∈ ∆(T−i × T−i) satisfying φi(t−i, t̃−i) > 0 ⇒
t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i) and πi(ti)[t−i] =
∑
t̃−i∈T−i
φi(t−i, t̃−i) for all t−i ∈ T−i, there exists y ∈
⋂
t̃i∈Ti
Yi[t̃i, f ] such that
∑
t−i,t̃−i
φi(t−i, t̃−i)ui
(
y(t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t̃−i
φi(t−i, t̃−i)ui
(
f(t
′
i, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
Lemma 5.5. An SCF f satisfies IRM if and only if every deception β that is unacceptable
for f is strongly refutable.11
As it is clear that strong refutability implies its weak version, we state the following
result without proof:
Corollary 5.6. If an SCF f satisfies IRM, it also satisfies weak IRM.
A single-valued deception βs is a profile of functions (βs1, . . . , β
s
n) such that β
s
i : Ti → Ti
for all i ∈ I. The single-valued deception βs is unacceptable for an SCF f if f(βs(t)) 6= f(t)
for some t ∈ T ; otherwise, βs is acceptable for f .
Next, we introduce a necessary condition for full implementation in Bayesian equilib-
rium:
11Proof is relegated to the Appendix.
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Definition 5.7. An SCF f satisfies Bayesian monotonicity (BM) if, for every single-
valued deception βs that is unacceptable for f , there exist i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and y : T−i →
∆(A) such that
Ui(y ◦ β
s
−i|ti) > Ui(f ◦ β
s|ti),
while for all t̃i ∈ Ti,
Ui(f |t̃i) ≥ Ui(y|t̃i).
By undermining an unacceptable deception, as with weak IRM or IRM, type ti can be
used as an ally to a designer who wishes to implement f , this time in Bayesian equilibrium.
However, since equilibrium (as opposed to rationalizability) is the solution concept used,
the deceptions considered in BM are single-valued and the requirements on beliefs over
the preference reversal are significanly reduced. For IRM, but not for weak IRM, we can
show the following implication:
Lemma 5.8. If an SCF f satisfies IRM, it satisfies BM.
Proof. Suppose that the SCF f satisfies IRM. Fix a single-valued deception βs that is
unacceptable for f . Define the “multi-valued” deception β such that βi(ti) = {ti, β
s
i (ti)}
for all ti ∈ Ti and i ∈ I. Since β
s is unacceptable, the deception β is also unacceptable.
By IRM, there exist i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and t
′
i ∈ βi(ti) satisfying t
′
i 6∼
f
i ti such that for
all φi ∈ ∆(T−i × T−i) satisfying φi(t−i, t̃−i) > 0 ⇒ t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i) and πi(ti)[t−i] =
∑
t̃−i∈T−i
φi(t−i, t̃−i) for all t−i ∈ T−i, there exists y ∈
⋂
t̃i∈Ti
Yi[t̃i, f ] such that
∑
t−i,t̃−i
φi(t−i, t̃−i)ui
(
y(t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t̃−i
ψi(t−i, t̃−i)ui
(
f(t
′
i, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
For each (t−i, t̃−i) ∈ T−i × T−i, we set
φi(t−i, t̃−i) =
{
πi(ti)[t−i], if t̃−i = β
s
−i(t−i)
0, if t̃−i 6= β
s
−i(t−i).
By construction, φi(t−i, t̃−i) > 0 ⇒ t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i) and πi(ti)[t−i] =
∑
t̃−i∈T−i
φi(t−i, t̃−i) for
all t−i ∈ T−i. Moreover, since t
′
i ∈ βi(ti) is such that t
′
i 6∼
f
i ti, it follows from construction
of β that t
′
i = β
s
i (ti). Therefore, the above inequality becomes
∑
t−i
πi(ti)[t−i]ui
(
y(βs−i(t−i)), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i
πi(ti)[t−i]ui
(
f(βsi (ti), β
s
−i(t−i)), (ti, t−i)
)
,
which is equivalent to Ui(y ◦β
s
−i|ti) > Ui(f ◦β
s|ti). In addition, y ∈
⋂
t̃i∈Ti
Yi[t̃i, f ] implies
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that for any t̃i ∈ Ti,
Ui(f |t̃i) ≥ Ui(y|t̃i).
Hence, f satisfies BM.
6 Sufficiency for Implementation of an SCF in In-
terim Rationalizable Strategies
In this section, we show that weak IRM is sufficient for implementation in interim ratio-
nalizable strategies under a mild additional assumption: weak no-worst-rule (NWR) (as
discussed below, our definition is weaker than the one appearing in Kunimoto (2019)).
For each i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti, define
Y wi [ti, f ] ≡ {y : T−i → ∆(A) : Ui(f |ti) ≥ Ui(y|ti)} .
Thus, Y wi [ti, f ] is the collection of all mappings y : T−i → ∆(A) such that y is weakly
worse than f for individual i of type ti. Notice that Yi[ti, f ] is a subset of Y
w
i [ti, f ].
Definition 6.1. The SCF f satisfies the weak no-worst-rule condition (weak NWR) if,
for all i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and φi ∈ ∆(T−i × T−i), there exist y, y
′
∈ Y wi [ti, f ] such that
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φi(t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
y(t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
6=
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φi(t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
y
′
(t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
Remark: The weak NWR condition implies that the strictly lower contour set of f is
nonempty for all types. Kunimoto (2019) also defines a “no worst rule” condition which
is stronger than our definition. Kunimoto (2019) requires the existence of mappings y
and y
′
in the set
⋂
t̃i∈Ti
Y wi [t̃i, f ] whereas we only require the existence of y and y
′
in the
set Y wi [ti, f ].
In the sufficiency result below, we focus on a countable subset of Y wi [ti, f ], as defined
next. Recall that ∆∗(A) is a countable dense subset of ∆(A). For each i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti,
define
Y ∗i [ti, f ] ≡
{
y : T−i → ∆(A) :
(i) y(t−i) ∈ ∆
∗(A)
⋃
t
′
i
∈Ti
{f(t
′
i, t−i)}, ∀t−i ∈ T−i, and
(ii) Ui(f |ti) ≥ Ui(y|ti).
}
Note that Y ∗i [ti, f ] ⊆ Y
w
i [ti, f ]. Since T−i is finite and ∆
∗(A)
⋃
t
′
i
∈Ti
{f(t
′
i, t−i)} is countable,
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Y ∗i [ti, f ] is also countable. Thus, we denote Y
∗
i [ti, f ] by {y
0
i [ti, f ], y
1
i [ti, f ], . . . , y
k
i [ti, f ], . . .}.
For each i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti, we then define y
ti,f
i such that
yti,fi (t−i) = (1− δ)
∞
∑
k=0
δkyki [ti, f ](t−i), ∀t−i,
where δ ∈ (0, 1).
Similarly, since A is countable, we denote it by {a0, a1, . . . , ak, . . .}. Then, we define
ᾱ = (1− η)
∞
∑
k=0
ηkak,
where η ∈ (0, 1).
The following lemma notes two important consequences of weak NWR (proof is rele-
gated to the Appendix):
Lemma 6.2. If an SCF f satisfies weak NWR, then the following statements are true:
(a) For all i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and φi ∈ ∆(T−i × T−i), there exists y ∈ Y
∗
i [ti, f ] such that
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φi(t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
y(t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φi(t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
yti,fi (t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
(b) For all i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and z
1
i ∈ ∆(T−i), there exists a ∈ A such that
∑
t−i
z1i (t−i)ui
(
a, (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i
z1i (t−i)ui
(
ᾱ, (ti, t−i)
)
.
We now state and prove our sufficiency result for implementation in interim rational-
izable strategies:
Theorem 6.3. For any SCF f , if there exists an SCF f̂ ≈ f such that f̂ satisfies weak
IRM and weak NWR, then the SCF f is implementable in interim rationalizable strategies.
Proof. We propose the following mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈I , g) to prove the sufficiency
result: For each individual i, pick any one type from Ti. We denote this type as t
∗
i .
Each individual i sends a message mi = (m
1
i , m
2
i , m
3
i , m
4
i ), where
• m1i = (m
1
i [j])j∈I such that m
1
i [j] ∈ Tj for all j ∈ I,
• m2i ∈ N,
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• m3i = (m
3
i [ti])ti∈Ti such that m
3
i [ti] ∈ Y
∗
i [ti, f̂ ] for all ti ∈ Ti,
• and m4i ∈ A.
Note that each Mi is countable.
The outcome function g :M → ∆(A) is defined as follows: For each m ∈M ,
Rule 1: m2i = 1 for all i ∈ I ⇒ g(m) = f̂(m
1
1[1], m
1
2[2], . . . , m
1
n[n]).
Rule 2: If there exists i ∈ I such that m2i > 1 but m
2
j = 1 for all j ∈ I\{i}, then one of
the following sub-rules apply:
Rule 2-1: If there exists ti ∈ Ti such that m
1
j [i] = ti for all j ∈ I\{i}, then
g(m) =
{
m3i [ti]
(
(m1j [j])j 6=i
)
with probability m2i /(m
2
i + 1),
yti,f̂i
(
(m1j [j])j 6=i
)
with probability 1/(m2i + 1).
Rule 2-2: If m1
j
′ [i] 6= m1k[i] for some j
′
, k ∈ I\{i}, then
g(m) =
{
m3i [t
∗
i ]
(
(m1j [j])j 6=i
)
with probability m2i /(m
2
i + 1),
y
t∗i ,f̂
i
(
(m1j [j])j 6=i
)
with probability 1/(m2i + 1).
Rule 3: In all other cases:
g(m) =
















m41 with probability m
2
1/(1 +m
2
1)n,
m42 with probability m
2
2/(1 +m
2
2)n,
...
...
m4n with probability m
2
n/(1 +m
2
n)n,
ᾱ with the remaining probability.
We now prove that the mechanism Γ implements the SCF f in interim rationalizable
strategies. The proof consists of Steps 1 through 3.
Step 1: mi ∈ S
Γ(T )
i (ti) ⇒ m
2
i = 1.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that mi ∈ S
Γ(T )
i (ti) but m
2
i > 1. Then, mi is
a best response of individual i of type ti against some conjecture λi ∈ ∆(T−i × M−i)
satisfying margT−iλi = πi(ti).
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For each t
′
i 6= t
∗
i and t
′
−i ∈ T−i, we define
M2−i(t
′
i, t
′
−i) =
{
m−i : m
2
j = 1 and m
1
j [i] = t
′
i, ∀j 6= i, and (m
1
j [j])j 6=i = t
′
−i
}
.
For t∗i and each t
′
−i ∈ T−i, we define
M2−i(t
∗
i , t
′
−i) =





m−i :
(m1j [j])j 6=i = t
′
−i and
either m2j = 1 and m
1
j [i] = t
∗
i , ∀j 6= i,
or m2j = 1, ∀j 6= i, but m
1
j
′ [i] 6= m1k[i] for some j
′
, k 6= i





.
Also, define
M3−i =
{
m−i : there exist one or more j 6= i such that m
2
j > 1
}
.
Note that
(
(M2−i(t̃i, t
′
−i))t̃i∈Ti,t′−i∈T−i
,M3−i
)
defines a partition of M−i. As m
2
i > 1, if
m−i ∈M
2
−i(t̃i, t
′
−i), then Rule 2 is used under the profile (mi, m−i), whereas if m−i ∈M
3
−i,
then Rule 3 is used under the profile (mi, m−i).
For each t̃i ∈ Ti, define
Λ2,t̃ii =
∑
t−i,t
′′
−i
∑
m−i∈M
2
−i
(t̃i,t
′′
−i
)
λi(t−i, m−i).
Thus, Λ2,t̃ii is the probability of the event that all other individuals report a message profile
in
⋃
t
′′
−i
M2−i(t̃i, t
′′
−i).
Also, define
Λ3i =
∑
t−i
∑
m−i∈M
3
−i
λi(t−i, m−i).
Thus, Λ3i is the probability of the event that all other individuals report a message profile
in M3−i.
If t̃i is such that Λ
2,t̃i
i > 0, then define φ
2,t̃i
i ∈ ∆(T−i×T−i) such that for all t−i, t
′
−i ∈ T−i,
φ2,t̃ii (t−i, t
′
−i) =
∑
m−i∈M
2
−i
(t̃i,t
′
−i
)
λi(t−i, m−i)
Λ2,t̃ii
.
Thus, φ2,t̃ii (t−i, t
′
−i) is the conditional probability of the event that the type profile of all
other individuals is t−i and they report a message profile in M
2
−i(t̃i, t
′
−i) given the event
that all other individuals report a message profile in
⋃
t
′′
−i
M2−i(t̃i, t
′′
−i).
If the type profile of all other individuals is t−i and they report a message profile in
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M2−i(t̃i, t
′
−i), then when individual i of type ti plays mi, she expects the outcome to be
given by the lottery
(
m2i
1 +m2i
)
m3i [t̃i]
(
t
′
−i
)
+
(
1−
m2i
1 +m2i
)
y t̃i,f̂i
(
t
′
−i
)
.
As a result, conditional on the event that all other individuals report a message profile in
⋃
t
′′
−i
M2−i(t̃i, t
′′
−i), the expected payoff of individual i of type ti when she plays mi is
(
m2i
1 +m2i
)
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φ2,t̃ii (t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
m3i [t̃i](t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
+
(
1−
m2i
1 +m2i
)
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φ2,t̃ii (t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
y t̃i,f̂i (t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
. (4)
If Λ3i > 0, then define φ
3
i ∈ ∆(T−i) such that, for any t−i ∈ T−i,
φ3i (t−i) =
∑
m−i∈M
3
−i
λi(t−i, m−i)
Λ3i
.
Thus, φ3i (t−i) is the conditional probability of the event that the type profile of all other
individuals is t−i and they report a message profile in M
3
−i given the event that all other
individuals report a message profile in M3−i.
If the type profile of all other individuals is t−i and they report a message profile
m−i ∈ M
3
−i, then when individual i of type ti plays mi, she expects the outcome to be
given by the lottery
1
n
(
m2i
1 +m2i
)
m4i +
1
n
(
1−
m2i
1 +m2i
)
ᾱ +
∑
j 6=i
(
1
n
(
m2j
1 +m2j
)
m4j +
1
n
(
1−
m2j
1 +m2j
)
ᾱ
)
.
As a result, conditional on the event that all other individuals report a message profile in
M3−i, the expected payoff of individual i of type ti when she plays mi is
1
n
(
m2i
1 +m2i
)
∑
t−i
φ3i (t−i)ui
(
m4i , (ti, t−i)
)
+
1
n
(
1−
m2i
1 +m2i
)
∑
t−i
φ3i (t−i)ui
(
ᾱ, (ti, t−i)
)
+
∑
t−i
∑
m−i∈M
3
−i
λi(t−i, m−i)
Λ3i
∑
j 6=i
(
1
n
(
m2j
1 +m2j
)
ui
(
m4j , (ti, t−i)
)
+
1
n
(
1−
m2j
1 +m2j
)
ui
(
ᾱ, (ti, t−i)
)
)
.
(5)
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Now let individual i of type ti deviate to m̂i = (m
1
i , m̂
2
i , m̂
3
i , m̂
4
i ) such that
• m̂2i = m
2
i + 1.
• m̂3i is defined as follows: for each t̃i ∈ Ti:
⊲ If Λ2,t̃ii > 0, then let m̂
3
i [t̃i] ∈ Y
∗
i [t̃i, f̂ ] be such that
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φ2,t̃ii (t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
m̂3i [t̃i](t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
≥
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φ2,t̃ii (t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
m3i [t̃i](t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
and
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φ2,t̃ii (t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
m̂3i [t̃i](t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φ2,t̃ii (t−i, t
′
−i)ui(y
t̃i,f̂
i (t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
Note that such m̂3i [t̃i] exists because of Lemma 6.2.
⊲ If Λ2,t̃ii = 0, then let m̂
3
i [t̃i] = m
3
i [t̃i].
• m̂4i is defined as follows:
⊲ If Λ3i > 0, then let m̂
4
i ∈ A be such that
∑
t−i
φ3i (t−i)ui
(
m̂4i , (ti, t−i)
)
≥
∑
t−i
φ3i (t−i)ui
(
m4i , (ti, t−i)
)
and
∑
t−i
φ3i (t−i)ui
(
m̂4i , (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i
φ3i (t−i)ui
(
ᾱ, (ti, t−i)
)
.
Note that such m̂4i exists because of Lemma 6.2.
⊲ If Λ3i = 0, then let m̂
4
i = m
4
i .
If Λ2,t̃ii > 0, then conditional on the event that all other individuals report a message
profile in
⋃
t
′′
−i
M2−i(t̃i, t
′′
−i), the expected payoff of individual i of type ti when she plays
m̂i is
(
m̂2i
1 + m̂2i
)
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φ2,t̃ii (t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
m̂3i [t̃i](t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
+
(
1−
m̂2i
1 + m̂2i
)
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φ2,t̃ii (t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
y t̃i,f̂i (t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
,
which is, by construction, greater than her expected payoff in (4) when she plays mi.
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If Λ3i > 0, then conditional on the event that all other individuals report a message
profile in M3−i, the expected payoff of individual i of type ti when she plays m̂i is
1
n
(
m̂2i
1 + m̂2i
)
∑
t−i
φ3i (t−i)ui
(
m̂4i , (ti, t−i)
)
+
1
n
(
1−
m̂2i
1 + m̂2i
)
∑
t−i
φ3i (t−i)ui
(
ᾱ, (ti, t−i)
)
+
∑
t−i
∑
m−i∈M
3
−i
λi(t−i, m−i)
Λ3i
∑
j 6=i
(
1
n
(
m2j
1 +m2j
)
ui
(
m4j , (ti, t−i)
)
+
1
n
(
1−
m2j
1 +m2j
)
ui
(
ᾱ, (ti, t−i)
)
)
,
which is, by construction, greater than her expected payoff in (5) when she plays mi.
As
∑
t̃i
Λ2,t̃ii + Λ
3
i = 1 (because m
2
i > 1), it follows that m̂i is a better response for
individual i of type ti against λi, a contradiction. This completes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2: For each i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti, let
βi(ti) = {ti} ∪ {t
′
i ∈ Ti : ∃mi ∈ S
Γ(T )
i (ti) such that m
1
i [i] = t
′
i}.
Then, the deception β = (βi)i∈I is acceptable for f̂ .
Proof. Suppose not, that is, β is unacceptable for f̂ . Then, by weak IRM, β must be
weakly refutable. That is, there exist i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and t
′
i ∈ βi(ti) satisfying t
′
i 6∼
f
i ti such
that for all ψi ∈ ∆(T−i × T ) satisfying ψi(t−i, t̃) > 0 ⇒ t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i) and πi(ti)[t−i] =
∑
t̃∈T ψi(t−i, t̃) for all t−i ∈ T−i, there exists an SCF f
′
such that f
′
(t̃i, ·) ∈ Yi[t̃i, f̂ ] for all
t̃i ∈ Ti and
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f
′
(t̃), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f̂(t
′
i, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
As t
′
i 6∼
f
i ti and t
′
i ∈ βi(ti), we can find a message mi ∈ S
Γ(T )
i (ti) such that m
1
i [i] = t
′
i.
From Step 1, we know that m2i = 1. Then, mi is a best response to some belief λi ∈
∆(T−i ×M−i) such that λi(t−i, m−i) > 0 ⇒ m−i ∈ S
Γ(T )
−i (t−i) and margT−iλi = πi(ti).
From Step 1, it follows that λi(t−i, m−i) > 0 implies m
2
j = 1 for all j 6= i. We next define
a partition of all those message profiles in M−i such that m
2
j = 1 for all j 6= i.
For each t̂i 6= t
∗
i and t̃−i ∈ T−i, we define
M1−i(t̂i, t̃−i) =
{
m−i : m
2
j = 1 and m
1
j [i] = t̂i, ∀j 6= i, and (m
1
j [j])j 6=i = t̃−i
}
.
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For t∗i and each t̃−i ∈ T−i, we define
M1−i(t
∗
i , t̃−i) =





m−i :
(m1j [j])j 6=i = t̃−i and
either m2j = 1 and m
1
j [i] = t
∗
i , ∀j 6= i,
or m2j = 1, ∀j 6= i, but m
1
j
′ [i] 6= m1k[i] for some j
′
, k 6= i





.
Define the belief ψ1i ∈ ∆(T−i × T ) as follows: For each t−i ∈ T−i and t̃ ∈ T , let
ψ1i (t−i, t̃) =
∑
m−i∈M
1
−i
(t̃i,t̃−i)
λi(t−i, m−i).
Thus, ψ1i (t−i, t̃) is the probability of the event that the type profile of all other individuals
is t−i and they report a message profile in M
1
−i(t̃i, t̃−i). In this event, individual i of type
ti expects the outcome to equal f̂(t
′
i, t̃−i) when she plays mi. As a result, the expected
payoff of individual i of type ti when she plays mi is
∑
t−i,t̃
ψ1i (t−i, t̃)ui
(
f̂(t
′
i, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
. (6)
Now, ψ1i (t−i, t̃) > 0 implies that λi(t−i, m−i) > 0 for some m−i ∈ M
1
−i(t̃i, t̃−i). But
λi(t−i, m−i) > 0 also implies that m−i ∈ S
Γ(T )
−i (t−i). Hence, due to the construction of β,
we have t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i). Moreover, since λi(t−i, m−i) > 0 implies m
2
j = 1 for all j 6= i, it
follows that
πi(ti)[t−i] =
∑
m−i∈M−i
λi(t−i, m−i) =
∑
m−i∈
⋃
t̃∈T M
1
−i
(t̃)
λi(t−i, m−i) =
∑
t̃∈T
ψ1i (t−i, t̃).
So, it follows from weak refutability of β that there exists and SCF f
′
such that f
′
(t̃i, ·) ∈
Yi[t̃i, f̂ ] for all t̃i ∈ Ti and
∑
t−i,t̃
ψ1i (t−i, t̃)ui
(
f
′
(t̃), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t̃
ψ1i (t−i, t̃)ui
(
f̂(t
′
i, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
It is without loss of generality to assume that the SCF f
′
is such that f
′
(t̃i, ·) ∈ Y
∗
i [t̃i, f̂ ]
for all t̃i ∈ Ti. To see this, pick any t̃i ∈ Ti.
If f
′
(t̃i, ·) ∈ Y
∗
i [t̃i, f̂ ], then for each integer z ≥ 1 and t−i ∈ T−i, define f
z(t̃i, t−i) =
f
′
(t̃i, t−i). Then f
z(t̃i, ·) ∈ Y
∗
i [t̃i, f̂ ] for all z.
If f
′
(t̃i, ·) 6∈ Y
∗
i [t̃i, f̂ ], then for each integer z ≥ 1 and t−i ∈ T−i, define f
z(t̃i, t−i) ∈
∆∗(A)
⋃
t
′
i
∈Ti
{f̂(t
′
i, t−i)} such that (a) if f
′
(t̃i, t−i) = f̂(t̃i, t−i), then f
z(t̃i, t−i) = f
′
(t̃i, t−i)
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for all z whereas (b) if f
′
(t̃i, t−i) 6= f̂(t̃i, t−i), then f
z(t̃i, t−i) converges to f
′
(t̃i, t−i) as z →
∞. Since f
′
(t̃i, ·) ∈ Yi[t̃i, f̂ ] but f
′
(t̃i, ·) 6∈ Y
∗
i [t̃i, f̂ ], it must be that f
′
(t̃i, t−i) 6= f̂(t̃i, t−i)
for some t−i ∈ T−i. This implies that Ui(f̂ |t̃i) > Ui(f
′
(t̃i, ·)|t̃i). As f
z(t̃i, ·) converges
pointwise to f
′
(t̃i, ·), T−i is finite, and ui(·, t) is continuous over ∆(A), we can find a
sufficiently large integer ẑ[t̃i] such that
Ui(f̂ |t̃i) > Ui(f
ẑ[t̃i](t̃i, ·)|t̃i), ∀z > z[t̃i].
Therefore, f ẑ[t̃i](t̃i, ·) ∈ Y
∗
i [t̃i, f̂ ] for all z > z[t̃i].
Consider the sequence of SCFs {f z}z∈N as defined above. As f
z converges pointwise
to f
′
, Ti is finite, and ui(·, t) is continuous over ∆(A), we can find a sufficiently large
integer ẑ such that f ẑ(t̃i, ·) ∈ Y
∗
i [t̃i, f̂ ] for all t̃i ∈ Ti and
∑
t−i,t̃
ψ1i (t−i, t̃)ui
(
f ẑ(t̃), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t̃
ψ1i (t−i, t̃)ui
(
f̂(t
′
i, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
Therefore, f
′
(t̃i, ·) ∈ Y
∗
i [t̃i, f̂ ] for all t̃i ∈ Ti.
Now, let individual i of type ti deviate to m̂i = (m
1
i , m̂
2
i , m̂
3
i , m
4
i ) such that
• m̂2i > 1, where the specific value is chosen later.
• m̂3i is defined as follows: m̂
3
i [t̃i] = f
′
(t̃i, ·) for all t̃i ∈ Ti.
Consider the event that the type profile of all other individuals is t−i and they report a
message profile inM1−i(t̃i, t̃−i). In this event, after the deviation to m̂i, type ti of individual
i expects the outcome to equal
(
m̂2i
1 + m̂2i
)
f
′
(t̃i, t̃−i) +
(
1−
m̂2i
1 + m̂2i
)
y t̃i,f̂i (t̃−i).
As a result, the expected payoff of individual i of type ti when she deviates to m̂i is
(
m̂2i
1 + m̂2i
)
∑
t−i,t̃
ψ1i (t−i, t̃)ui
(
f
′
(t̃), (ti, t−i)
)
+
(
1−
m̂2i
1 + m̂2i
)
∑
t−i,t̃
ψ1i (t−i, t̃)ui
(
y t̃i,f̂i (t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
If m̂2i is large enough, then the above expression is greater than her expected payoff in
(6) when she plays mi. It follows that m̂i is a better response for individual i of type
ti against λi, a contradiction. Thus, β is acceptable. This completes the proof of Step
2.
It follows from Steps 1 and 2 that m ∈ SΓ(T )(t) ⇒ g(m) = f̂(t).
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Step 3: Define the message correspondence profile S = (S1, . . . ,Sn) where each Si : Ti →
2Mi such that for all i ∈ I and ti ∈ Ti,
Si(ti) = {(m
1
i , 1, m
3
i , m
4
i ) : m
1
i [i] = ti}.
Then, we have b(S) ≥ S, which implies that S ≤ SΓ(T ).
Proof. Pick any i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, andmi ∈ Si(ti). Pick any σ̃−i : T−i →M−i such that, for all
j 6= i and tj ∈ Tj , (i) σ̃j(tj) ∈ Sj(tj) and (ii) σ̃
1
j (tj)[i] = ti. Let the belief λi ∈ ∆(T−i×M−i)
be such that for all t−i ∈ T−i, λi(t−i, m−i) = 0 whenever m−i 6= σ̃−i(t−i). Then, by
construction, λi(t−i, m−i) > 0 implies that m−i ∈ S−i(t−i) and margT−iλi = πi(ti). When
individual i of type ti holds the belief λi and plays mi, then she expects the payoff of
∑
t−i
πi(ti)[t−i]ui
(
f̂(ti, t−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
On the one hand, if she deviates to m̂i such that m̂
1
i [i] = t
′
i and m̂
2
i = 1, then she expects
the payoff of
∑
t−i
πi(ti)[t−i]ui
(
f̂(t
′
i, t−i), (ti, t−i)
)
,
which is not improving due to SIRBIC. Recall that weak IRM of f̂ implies that f̂ satisfies
SIRBIC (Lemma 5.2). On the other hand, if she deviates to m̂i such that m̂
2
i > 1, then
she expects the payoff of
(
m̂2i
1 + m̂2i
)
∑
t−i
πi(ti)[t−i]ui
(
m̂3i [ti](t−i), (ti, t−i)
)
+
(
1−
m̂2i
1 + m̂2i
)
∑
t−i
πi(ti)[t−i]ui
(
yti,f̂i (t−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
As m̂3i [ti] ∈ Y
∗
i [ti, f̂ ], she cannot improve her payoff by any such deviation. Hence, mi ∈
bi(S)[ti]. This completes the proof of Step 3.
Steps 1 through 3 together comprise the proof of the theorem.
7 IRM Is Not Necessary for Interim Rationalizable
Implementation
In this section, we disprove the claim made in Oury and Tercieux (2012, footnote 4) that
IRM is necessary for interim rationalizable implementation. We base our arguments on
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the following example, which is built upon the example presented in Kunimoto and Saran
(2020).
Example 7.1. There are two players i ∈ {1, 2}. Player 1 has three types: T1 = {t1, t
′
1, t
′′
1}
and player 2 has two types: T2 = {t2, t
′
2}. The beliefs of the players are as follows:
π1(t1)[t2] = 0.99, π1(t
′
1)[t2] = π1(t
′′
1)[t2] = 0
and
π2(t2)[t1] = π2(t2)[t
′
1] = π2(t2)[t
′′
1 ] =
1
3
, π2(t
′
2)[t
′
1] = 1.
Notice that T ∗ = T since for every state, there is a type of a player who puts positive
probability on that state. Thus, we need not discuss equivalent SCFs in this setup.
There are six pure alternatives: A = {a, b, c, d, z, z
′
}. The following tables list the
payoffs of the two players:
a t2 t
′
2
t1 4, 4 4, 0
t
′
1 0, 0 4, 1
t
′′
1 1, 1 4, 0
b t2 t
′
2
t1 0, 0 3, 3
t
′
1 1, 1 2, 0
t
′′
1 0, 0 2, 1
c t2 t
′
2
t1 0, 0 3, 1
t
′
1 3, 3 3, 0
t
′′
1 3, 3 3, 0
d t2 t
′
2
t1 3, 4 2, 0
t
′
1 0, 3 3, 3
t
′′
1 0, 3 3, 3
z t2 t
′
2
t1 4, 1 2, 0
t
′
1 2, 2 5, 0
t
′′
1 2, 2 2, 0
z
′
t2 t
′
2
t1 4, 0 4, 1
t
′
1 2, 0 2, 2
t
′′
1 2, 0 5, 0
The SCF f selects the alternative which maximizes the aggregate payoff in each state.
f t2 t
′
2
t1 a b
t
′
1 c d
t
′′
1 c d
We first show that f fails BM.
Claim 7.2. The SCF f violates BM.
Proof. Consider the single-valued deception βs such that
βs1(t1) = t
′
1, β
s
1(t
′
1) = t
′
1, β
s
1(t
′′
1) = t
′′
1 ,
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and
βs2(t2) = t
′
2, β
s
2(t
′
2) = t
′
2.
First, consider player 2 of type t2. There exists no y : T1 → ∆(A) such that
U2(y ◦ β
s
1|t2) =
1
3
u2
(
y(t
′
1), (t1, t2)
)
+
1
3
u2
(
y(t
′
1), (t
′
1, t2)
)
+
1
3
u2
(
y(t
′′
1), (t
′′
1 , t2)
)
> U2(f ◦ β
s|t2) =
1
3
u2
(
f(t
′
1, t
′
2), (t1, t2)
)
+
1
3
u2
(
f(t
′
1, t
′
2), (t
′
1, t2)
)
+
1
3
u2
(
f(t
′′
1 , t
′
2), (t
′′
1 , t2)
)
,
because f(t
′
1, t
′
2) = f(t
′′
1 , t
′
2) = d is one of the best alternatives for player 2 of type t2 in
each state.
Second, consider player 2 of type t
′
2. There exists no y : T1 → ∆(A) such that
U2(y ◦ β
s
1|t
′
2) > U2(f ◦ β
s|t
′
2) and U2(f |t
′
2) ≥ U2(y|t
′
2).
Since U2(f ◦ β
s|t
′
2) = u2(f(t
′
1, t
′
2), (t
′
1, t
′
2)) = U2(f |t
′
2), if the above inequalities were true,
then we must have U2(y ◦β
s
1|t
′
2) > U2(y|t
′
2). But that is impossible because U2(y ◦β
s
1|t
′
2) =
u2
(
y(t
′
1), (t
′
1, t
′
2)
)
= U2(y|t
′
2).
Third, consider player 1 of type t1. Pick any y : T2 → ∆(A) such that
U1(f |t1) ≥ U1(y|t1), U1(f |t
′
1) ≥ U1(y|t
′
1), and U1(f |t
′′
1) ≥ U1(y|t
′′
1).
The last two inequalities imply that
u1
(
f(t
′
1, t
′
2), (t
′
1, t
′
2)
)
≥ u1
(
y(t
′
2), (t
′
1, t
′
2)
)
u1
(
f(t
′′
1 , t
′
2), (t
′′
1 , t
′
2)
)
≥ u1
(
y(t
′
2), (t
′′
1 , t
′
2)
)
.
These two inequalities lead to
2y(t
′
2)[z] + y(t
′
2)[a] ≤ y(t
′
2)[z
′
] + y(t
′
2)[b] and 2y(t
′
2)[z
′
] + y(t
′
2)[a] ≤ y(t
′
2)[z] + y(t
′
2)[b],
where y(t
′
2)[x] is the probability of alternative x in the lottery y(t
′
2). Summing these two
inequalities, we obtain y(t
′
2)[z] + y(t
′
2)[z
′
] + 2y(t
′
2)[a] ≤ 2y(t
′
2)[b].
In order to find the required preference reversal for type t1, we must satisfy U1(y ◦
βs2|t1) > U1(f ◦ β
s|t1), that is,
0.99u1
(
y(t
′
2), (t1, t2)
)
+0.01u1
(
y(t
′
2), (t1, t
′
2)
)
> 0.99u1
(
f(t
′
1, t
′
2), (t1, t2)
)
+0.01u1
(
f(t
′
1, t
′
2), (t1, t
′
2)
)
.
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The above inequality is translated into
0.99(y(t
′
2)[z] + y(t
′
2)[z
′
] + y(t
′
2)[a]) + 0.01(2y(t
′
2)[a] + y(t
′
2)[b] + y(t
′
2)[c] + 2y(t
′
2)[z
′
])
> 0.99(3y(t
′
2)[b] + 3y(t
′
2)[c]).
As y(t
′
2)[z] + y(t
′
2)[z
′
] + 2y(t
′
2)[a] ≤ 2y(t
′
2)[b], we must have y(t
′
2)[z
′
] ≤ 2y(t
′
2)[b]. Plugging
this into the left-hand side of the above inequality gives us
0.99(y(t
′
2)[z] + y(t
′
2)[z
′
] + y(t
′
2)[a]) + 0.01(2y(t
′
2)[a] + 5y(t
′
2)[b] + y(t
′
2)[c])
> 0.99(3y(t
′
2)[b] + 3y(t
′
2)[c]).
We claim that this inequality is impossible to be satisfied. Now plugging y(t
′
2)[z] +
y(t
′
2)[z
′
] + 2y(t
′
2)[a] ≤ 2y(t
′
2)[b] into the right-hand side of the above inequality, we obtain
− 0.99y(t
′
2)[a] + 0.01(2y(t
′
2)[a] + 5y(t
′
2)[b] + y(t
′
2)[c]) > 0.99(y(t
′
2)[b] + 3y(t
′
2)[c])
⇒ −0.97y(t
′
2)[a]− 0.94y(t
′
2)[b]− 2.96y(t
′
2)[c] > 0,
which is indeed impossible.
Fourth, consider player 1 of type t
′
1. There does not exist any y : T2 → ∆(A) such
that
U1(y ◦ β
s
2|t
′
1) > U1(f ◦ β
s|t
′
1) and U1(f |t
′
1) ≥ U1(y|t
′
1).
Since U1(f ◦ β
s|t
′
1) = u1
(
f(t
′
1, t
′
2), (t
′
1, t
′
2)
)
= U1(f |t
′
1), if the above inequalities were true,
then we must have U1(y ◦β
s
2|t
′
1) > U1(y|t
′
1). But that is impossible because U1(y ◦β
s
2|t
′
1) =
u1
(
y(t
′
2), (t
′
1, t
′
2)
)
= U1(y|t
′
1).
Finally, consider player 1 of type t
′′
1 . There does not exist any y : T2 → ∆(A) such
that
U1(y ◦ β
s
2|t
′′
1) > U1(f ◦ β
s|t
′′
1) and U1(f |t
′′
1) ≥ U1(y|t
′′
1).
Since U1(f ◦ β
s|t
′′
1) = u1
(
f(t
′′
1 , t
′
2), (t
′′
1 , t
′
2)
)
= U1(f |t
′′
1), if the above inequalities were true,
then we must have U1(y◦β
s
2|t
′′
1) > U1(y|t
′′
1). But that is impossible because U1(y◦β
s
2|t
′′
1) =
u1
(
y(t
′
2), (t
′′
1 , t
′
2)
)
= U1(y|t
′′
1).
We therefore conclude that the SCF f does not satisfy BM.
Since we know from Lemma 5.8 that IRM implies BM, we state the following result
without proof.
Claim 7.3. The SCF f violates IRM.
Next, we argue that f satisfies weak IRM.
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Claim 7.4. The SCF f satisfies weak IRM.
Proof. First, we consider any unacceptable deception β such that either t
′
1 ∈ β1(t1) or
t
′′
1 ∈ β1(t1). Pick any belief ψ1 ∈ ∆(T2 × T ). Then
∑
t̂2,t̃
ψ1(t̂2, t̃)u1
(
f(t
′
1, t̃2), (t1, t̂2)
)
=
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t2, t̃1, t2)u1
(
f(t
′
1, t2), (t1, t2)
)
+
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t2, t̃1, t
′
2)u1
(
f(t
′
1, t
′
2), (t1, t2)
)
+
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t
′
2, t̃1, t2)u1
(
f(t
′
1, t2), (t1, t
′
2)
)
+
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t
′
2, t̃1, t
′
2)u1
(
f(t
′
1, t
′
2), (t1, t
′
2)
)
= 3
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t
′
2, t̃1, t2) + 3
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t2, t̃1, t
′
2) + 2
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t
′
2, t̃1, t
′
2).
Since f(t
′
1, t2) = f(t
′′
1 , t2) = c and f(t
′
1, t
′
2) = f(t
′′
1 , t
′
2) = d, we also obtain
∑
t̂2,t̃
ψ1(t̂2, t̃)u1
(
f(t
′′
1 , t̃2), (t1, t̂2)
)
= 3
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t
′
2, t̃1, t2) + 3
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t2, t̃1, t
′
2) + 2
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t
′
2, t̃1, t
′
2).
Consider the SCF f
′
defined as follows:
f
′
t2 t
′
2
t1 a
2
3
z + 1
3
z
′
t
′
1 a z
′
t
′′
1 a
1
5
c+ 4
5
z
It is straightforward to confirm that f
′
(t̃1, ·) ∈ Y1[t̃1, f ] for all t̃1 ∈ T1. Moreover,
∑
t̂2,t̃
ψ1(t̂2, t̃)u1
(
f
′
(t̃), (t1, t̂2)
)
=
∑
t̂2,t̃2
ψ1(t̂2, t1, t̃2)u1
(
f
′
(t1, t̃2), (t1, t̂2)
)
+
∑
t̂2,t̃2
ψ1(t̂2, t
′
1, t̃2)u1
(
f
′
(t
′
1, t̃2), (t1, t̂2)
)
+
∑
t̂2,t̃2
ψ1(t̂2, t
′′
1 , t̃2)u1
(
f
′
(t
′′
1 , t̃2), (t1, t̂2)
)
.
We consider each term on the right-hand side of the above equation separately. The
first term is:
∑
t̂2,t̃2
ψ1(t̂2, t1, t̃2)u1
(
f
′
(t1, t̃2), (t1, t̂2)
)
= ψ1(t2, t1, t2)u1
(
f
′
(t1, t2), (t1, t2)
)
+ ψ1(t2, t1, t
′
2)u1
(
f
′
(t1, t
′
2), (t1, t2)
)
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+ψ1(t
′
2, t1, t2)u1
(
f
′
(t1, t2), (t1, t
′
2)
)
+ ψ1(t
′
2, t1, t
′
2)u1
(
f
′
(t1, t
′
2), (t1, t
′
2)
)
= 4ψ1(t2, t1, t2) + 4ψ1(t
′
2, t1, t2) + 4ψ1(t2, t1, t
′
2) +
8
3
ψ1(t
′
2, t1, t
′
2).
The second term is:
∑
t̂2,t̃2
ψ1(t̂2, t
′
1, t̃2)u1
(
f
′
(t
′
1, t̃2), (t1, t̂2)
)
= ψ1(t2, t
′
1, t2)u1
(
f
′
(t
′
1, t2), (t1, t2)
)
+ ψ1(t2, t
′
1, t
′
2)u1
(
f
′
(t
′
1, t
′
2), (t1, t2)
)
+ψ1(t
′
2, t
′
1, t2)u1
(
f
′
(t
′
1, t2), (t1, t
′
2)
)
+ ψ1(t
′
2, t
′
1, t
′
2)u1
(
f
′
(t
′
1, t
′
2), (t1, t
′
2)
)
= 4ψ1(t2, t
′
1, t2) + 4ψ1(t
′
2, t
′
1, t2) + 4ψ1(t2, t
′
1, t
′
2) + 4ψ1(t
′
2, t
′
1, t
′
2).
The third term is:
∑
t̂2,t̃2
ψ1(t̂2, t
′′
1 , t̃2)u1
(
f
′
(t
′′
1 , t̃2), (t1, t̂2)
)
= ψ1(t2, t
′′
1 , t2)u1
(
f
′
(t
′′
1 , t2), (t1, t2)
)
+ ψ1(t2, t
′′
1 , t
′
2)u1
(
f
′
(t
′′
1 , t
′
2), (t1, t2)
)
+ψ1(t
′
2, t
′′
1 , t2)u1
(
f
′
(t
′′
1 , t2), (t1, t
′
2)
)
+ ψ1(t
′
2, t
′′
1 , t
′
2)u1
(
f
′
(t
′′
1 , t
′
2), (t1, t
′
2)
)
= 4ψ1(t2, t
′′
1 , t2) + 4ψ1(t
′
2, t
′′
1 , t2) +
16
5
ψ1(t2, t
′′
1 , t
′
2) +
11
5
ψ1(t
′
2, t
′′
1 , t
′
2).
Summing the three terms, we get
∑
t̂2,t̃
ψ1(t̂2, t̃)u1
(
f
′
(t̃), (t1, t̂2)
)
= 4
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t2, t̃1, t2) + 4
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t
′
2, t̃1, t2)
+
(
4ψ1(t2, t1, t
′
2) + 4ψ1(t2, t
′
1, t
′
2) +
16
5
ψ1(t2, t
′′
1 , t
′
2)
)
+
(
8
3
ψ1(t
′
2, t1, t
′
2) + 4ψ1(t
′
2, t
′
1, t
′
2) +
11
5
ψ1(t
′
2, t
′′
1 , t
′
2)
)
≥ 4
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t2, t̃1, t2) + 4
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t
′
2, t̃1, t2) +
16
5
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t2, t̃1, t
′
2) +
11
5
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t
′
2, t̃1, t
′
2)
> 3
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t
′
2, t̃1, t2) + 3
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t2, t̃1, t
′
2) + 2
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t
′
2, t̃1, t
′
2).
We therefore conclude that
∑
t̂2,t̃
ψ1(t̂2, t̃)u1
(
f
′
(t̃), (t1, t̂2)
)
>
∑
t̂2,t̃
ψ1(t̂2, t̃)u1
(
f(t
′
1, t̃2), (t1, t̂2)
)
.
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Similarly,
∑
t̂2,t̃
ψ1(t̂2, t̃)u1
(
f
′
(t̃), (t1, t̂2)
)
>
∑
t̂2,t̃
ψ1(t̂2, t̃)u1
(
f(t
′′
1 , t̃2), (t1, t̂2)
)
.
It follows that any unacceptable deception β satisfying t
′
1 ∈ β1(t1) is weakly refutable
using the tuple (1, t1, t
′
1) whereas any unacceptable deception β satisfying t
′′
1 ∈ β1(t1) is
weakly refutable using the tuple (1, t1, t
′′
1).
Second, we consider any unacceptable deception β such that t
′
2 ∈ β2(t2) and β1(t1) =
{t1}. Pick any belief ψ2 ∈ ∆(T1×T ) such that ψ2(t̂1, t̃) > 0 ⇒ t̃1 ∈ β1(t̂1) and π2(t2)[t̂1] =
∑
t̃ ψ2(t̂1, t̃) for all t̂1. Then we have ψ2(t1, t̃) = 0 whenever t̃1 6= t1 and
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t1, t1, t̃2) =
1/3. Therefore,
∑
t̂1,t̃
ψ2(t̂1, t̃)u2
(
f(t̃1, t
′
2), (t̂1, t2)
)
=
∑
t̃
ψ2(t1, t̃)u2
(
f(t̃1, t
′
2), (t1, t2)
)
+
∑
t̃
ψ2(t
′
1, t̃)u2
(
f(t̃1, t
′
2), (t
′
1, t2)
)
+
∑
t̃
ψ2(t
′′
1 , t̃)u2
(
f(t̃1, t
′
2), (t
′′
1 , t2)
)
=
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t1, t1, t̃2)u2
(
f(t1, t
′
2), (t1, t2)
)
+
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t
′
1, t1, t̃2)u2
(
f(t1, t
′
2), (t
′
1, t2)
)
+
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t
′
1, t
′
1, t̃2)u2
(
f(t
′
1, t
′
2), (t
′
1, t2)
)
+
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t
′
1, t
′′
1 , t̃2)u2
(
f(t
′′
1 , t
′
2), (t
′
1, t2)
)
+
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t
′′
1 , t1, t̃2)u2
(
f(t1, t
′
2), (t
′′
1 , t2)
)
+
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t
′′
1 , t
′
1, t̃2)u2
(
f(t
′
1, t
′
2), (t
′′
1 , t2)
)
+
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t
′′
1 , t
′′
1 , t̃2)u2
(
f(t
′′
1 , t
′
2), (t
′′
1 , t2)
)
=
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t
′
1, t1, t̃2) + 3
∑
t̃2
(
ψ2(t
′
1, t
′
1, t̃2) + ψ2(t
′
1, t
′′
1 , t̃2) + ψ2(t
′′
1 , t
′
1, t̃2) + ψ2(t
′′
1 , t
′′
1 , t̃2)
)
.
Consider the SCF f
′
defined as follows:
f
′
t2 t
′
2
t1 z z
t
′
1 d d
t
′′
1 d d
It is straightforward to confirm that f
′
(·, t̃2) ∈ Y2[t̃2, f ] for all t̃2 ∈ T2. Moreover, because
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f
′
(t̃1, t2) = f
′
(t̃1, t
′
2) for all t̃1 ∈ T1, we have
∑
t̂1,t̃
ψ2(t̂1, t̃)u2
(
f
′
(t̃), (t̂1, t2)
)
=
∑
t̂1,t̃
ψ2(t̂1, t̃)u2
(
f
′
(t̃1, t
′
2), (t̂1, t2)
)
.
Since ψ2(t1, t̃) = 0 whenever t̃1 6= t1 and
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t1, t1, t̃2) = 1/3, by applying here similar
arguments as in the case of the SCF f , we obtain that
∑
t̂1,t̃
ψ2(t̂1, t̃)u2
(
f
′
(t̃1, t
′
2), (t̂1, t2)
)
=
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t1, t1, t̃2) + 2
∑
t̃2
(
ψ2(t
′
1, t1, t̃2) + ψ2(t
′′
1 , t1, t̃2))
+3
∑
t̃2
(
ψ2(t
′
1, t
′
1, t̃2) + ψ2(t
′
1, t
′′
1 , t̃2) + ψ2(t
′′
1 , t
′
1, t̃2) + ψ2(t
′′
1 , t
′′
1 , t̃2)
)
>
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t
′
1, t1, t̃2) + 3
∑
t̃2
(
ψ2(t
′
1, t
′
1, t̃2) + ψ2(t
′
1, t
′′
1 , t̃2) + ψ2(t
′′
1 , t
′
1, t̃2) + ψ2(t
′′
1 , t
′′
1 , t̃2)
)
.
It follows that
∑
t̂1,t̃
ψ2(t̂1, t̃)u2
(
f
′
(t̃), (t̂1, t2)
)
>
∑
t̂1,t̃
ψ2(t̂1, t̃)u2
(
f(t̃1, t
′
2), (t̂1, t2)
)
.
Therefore, any unacceptable deception β such that t
′
2 ∈ β2(t2) and β1(t1) = {t1} is weakly
refutable using the tuple (2, t2, t
′
2).
Third, we consider any unacceptable deception β such that t2 ∈ β2(t
′
2) and β1(t1) =
{t1}. Pick any belief ψ2 ∈ ∆(T1× T ) such that ψ2(t̂1, t̃) > 0 ⇒ t̃1 ∈ β1(t̂1). Then we have
that ψ2(t1, t̃) = 0 whenever t̃1 6= t1. Therefore,
∑
t̂1,t̃
ψ2(t̂1, t̃)u2
(
f(t̃1, t2), (t̂1, t
′
2)
)
=
∑
t̃
ψ2(t1, t̃)u2
(
f(t̃1, t2), (t1, t
′
2)
)
+
∑
t̃
ψ2(t
′
1, t̃)u2
(
f(t̃1, t2), (t
′
1, t
′
2)
)
+
∑
t̃
ψ2(t
′′
1 , t̃)u2
(
f(t̃1, t2), (t
′′
1 , t
′
2)
)
=
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t1, t1, t̃2)u2
(
f(t1, t2), (t1, t
′
2)
)
+
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t
′
1, t1, t̃2)u2
(
f(t1, t2), (t
′
1, t
′
2)
)
+
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t
′
1, t
′
1, t̃2)u2
(
f(t
′
1, t2), (t
′
1, t
′
2)
)
+
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t
′
1, t
′′
1 , t̃2)u2
(
f(t
′′
1 , t2), (t
′
1, t
′
2)
)
+
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t
′′
1 , t1, t̃2)u2
(
f(t1, t2), (t
′′
1 , t
′
2)
)
+
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t
′′
1 , t
′
1, t̃2)u2
(
f(t
′
1, t2), (t
′′
1 , t
′
2)
)
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+
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t
′′
1 , t
′′
1 , t̃2)u2
(
f(t
′′
1 , t2), (t
′′
1 , t
′
2)
)
=
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t
′
1, t1, t̃2).
Consider the constant SCF f
′
such that f
′
(t̃) = 1
4
b + 3
4
z
′
for all t̃ ∈ T . It is
straightforward to confirm that f
′
(·, t̃2) ∈ Y2[t̃2, f ] for all t̃2 ∈ T2. Moreover, because
f
′
(t̃1, t2) = f
′
(t̃1, t
′
2) for all t̃1 ∈ T1, we have
∑
t̂1,t̃
ψ2(t̂1, t̃)u2
(
f
′
(t̃), (t̂1, t
′
2)
)
=
∑
t̂1,t̃
ψ2(t̂1, t̃)u2
(
f
′
(t̃1, t2), (t̂1, t
′
2)
)
.
Since ψ2(t1, t̃) = 0 whenever t̃1 6= t1, by applying here similar arguments as in the case of
the SCF f , we obtain that
∑
t̂1,t̃
ψ2(t̂1, t̃)u2
(
f
′
(t̃1, t2), (t̂1, t
′
2)
)
=
3
2
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t1, t1, t̃2) +
3
2
∑
t̃2
(
ψ2(t
′
1, t1, t̃2) + ψ2(t
′
1, t
′
1, t̃2) + ψ2(t
′
1, t
′′
1 , t̃2)
)
+
1
4
∑
t̃2
(
ψ2(t
′′
1 , t1, t̃2) + ψ2(t
′′
1 , t
′
1, t̃2) + ψ2(t
′′
1 , t
′′
1 , t̃2)
)
>
∑
t̃2
ψ2(t
′
1, t1, t̃2).
It follows that
∑
t̂1,t̃
ψ2(t̂1, t̃)u2
(
f
′
(t̃), (t̂1, t
′
2)
)
>
∑
t̂1,t̃
ψ2(t̂1, t̃)u2
(
f(t̃1, t2), (t̂1, t
′
2)
)
.
Therefore, any unacceptable deception β such that t2 ∈ β2(t
′
2) and β1(t1) = {t1} is weakly
refutable using the tuple (2, t
′
2, t2).
Fourth, we consider any unacceptable deception such that β1(t1) = {t1}, β2(t2) = {t2},
and β2(t
′
2) = {t
′
2}. Such a deception involves either t1 ∈ β1(t
′
1) or t1 ∈ β1(t
′′
1). Then the
fact that f satisfies SIRBIC implies that β is weakly refutable. We show this formally
for the case when t1 ∈ β1(t
′
1) and we skip the case when t1 ∈ β1(t
′′
1), as we can show it
similarly. So suppose t1 ∈ β1(t
′
1). Pick any belief ψ1 ∈ ∆(T2 × T ) such that ψ1(t̂2, t̃) >
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0 ⇒ t̃2 ∈ β2(t̂2). Then we have that ψ1(t̂2, t̃) = 0 whenever t̃2 6= t̂2. Therefore,
∑
t̂2,t̃
ψ1(t̂2, t̃)u1
(
f(t1, t̃2), (t
′
1, t̂2)
)
=
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t2, t̃1, t2)u1(f(t1, t2), (t
′
1, t2)) +
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t
′
2, t̃1, t
′
2)u1(f(t1, t
′
2), (t
′
1, t
′
2))
= 2
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t
′
2, t̃1, t
′
2).
Consider the SCF f
′
defined as follows:
f
′
t2 t
′
2
t1 c d
t
′
1 c d
t
′′
1 c d
It is straightforward to confirm that f
′
(t̃1, ·) ∈ Y1[t̃1, f ] for all t̃1 ∈ T1. Moreover, since
ψ1(t̂2, t̃) = 0 whenever t̃2 6= t̂2,
∑
t̂2,t̃
ψ1(t̂2, t̃)u1
(
f
′
(t̃), (t
′
1, t̂2)
)
=
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t2, t̃1, t2)u1(f
′
(t̃1, t2), (t
′
1, t2)) +
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t
′
2, t̃1, t
′
2)u1(f
′
(t̃1, t
′
2), (t
′
1, t
′
2)
= 3
∑
t̃1
(
ψ1(t2, t̃1, t2) + ψ1(t
′
2, t̃1, t
′
2)
)
> 2
∑
t̃1
ψ1(t
′
2, t̃1, t
′
2)
=
∑
t̂2,t̃
ψ1(t̂2, t̃)u1
(
f(t1, t̃2), (t
′
1, t̂2)
)
.
It follows that the deception β is weakly refutable using the tuple (1, t
′
1, t1).
We thus conclude that every unacceptable deception is weakly refutable, and hence f
satisfies weak IRM.
We now check that the SCF f satisfies weak NWR.
Claim 7.5. The SCF f satisfies weak NWR.
Proof. First, we consider player 1 of type t1. Let y : T2 → ∆(A) be such that y(t2) = a
and y(t
′
2) = z. Also, let y
′
: T2 → ∆(A) be such that y
′
(t2) = b and y
′
(t
′
2) = d. It is
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straightforward to confirm that y, y
′
∈ Y w1 [t1, f ]. Now,
∑
t̃2,t̃
′
2
φ1(t̃2, t̃
′
2)u1
(
y(t̃
′
2), (t1, t̃2)
)
= φ1(t2, t2)u1
(
y(t2), (t1, t2)
)
+ φ1(t2, t
′
2)u1
(
y(t
′
2), (t1, t2)
)
+φ1(t
′
2, t2)u1
(
y(t2), (t1, t
′
2)
)
+ φ1(t
′
2, t
′
2)u1
(
y(t
′
2), (t1, t
′
2)
)
= 4φ1(t2, t2) + 4φ1(t2, t
′
2) + 4φ1(t
′
2, t2) + 2φ1(t
′
2, t
′
2).
whereas
∑
t̃2,t̃
′
2
φ1(t̃2, t̃
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(t̃
′
2), (t1, t̃2)
)
= φ1(t2, t2)u1
(
y
′
(t2), (t1, t2)
)
+ φ1(t2, t
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(t
′
2), (t1, t2)
)
+φ1(t
′
2, t2)u1
(
y
′
(t2), (t1, t
′
2)
)
+ φ1(t
′
2, t
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(t
′
2), (t1, t
′
2)
)
= 3φ1(t2, t
′
2) + 3φ1(t
′
2, t2) + 2φ1(t
′
2, t
′
2).
We therefore have that
∑
t̃2,t̃
′
2
φ1(t̃2, t̃
′
2)u1
(
y(t̃
′
2), (t1, t̃2)
)
=
∑
t̃2,t̃
′
2
φ1(t̃2, t̃
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(t̃
′
2), (t1, t̃2)
)
⇔ φ1(t
′
2, t
′
2) = 1.
Thus, for all φ1 ∈ ∆(T2 × T2) such that φ1(t
′
2, t
′
2) < 1, we have found y, y
′
∈ Y w1 [t1] that
satisfy the requirement for weak NWR. If φ1 is such that φ1(t
′
2, t
′
2) = 1, then we define
y : T2 → ∆(A) such that y(t2) = y(t
′
2) = b and y
′
: T2 → ∆(A) such that y
′
(t2) =
y
′
(t
′
2) = d. It is straightforward to confirm that y, y
′
∈ Y w1 [t1, f ]. Since φ1(t
′
2, t
′
2) = 1,
u1(y(t
′
2), (t1, t
′
2)) = u1(b, (t1, t
′
2)) = 3 and u1(y
′
(t
′
2), (t1, t
′
2)) = u1(d, (t1, t
′
2)) = 2, we obtain
∑
t̃2,t̃
′
2
φ1(t̃2, t̃
′
2)u1
(
y(t̃
′
2), (t1, t̃2)
)
>
∑
t̃2,t̃
′
2
φ1(t̃2, t̃
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(t̃
′
2), (t1, t̃2)
)
.
Thus, if φ1 is such that φ1(t
′
2, t
′
2) = 1, then the requirement for weak NWR is also satisfied.
Second, we consider player 1 of type t
′
1. Then we define y : T2 → ∆(A) such that
y(t2) = y(t
′
2) = c and y
′
: T2 → ∆(A) such that y
′
(t2) = y
′
(t
′
2) = b. It is straightforward
to confirm that y, y
′
∈ Y w1 [t
′
1, f ]. Fix φ1 ∈ ∆(T2 × T2). Now,
∑
t̃2,t̃
′
2
φ1(t̃2, t̃
′
2)u1
(
y(t̃
′
2), (t
′
1, t̃2)
)
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= φ1(t2, t2)u1
(
y(t2), (t
′
1, t2)
)
+ φ1(t2, t
′
2)u1
(
y(t
′
2), (t
′
1, t2)
)
+φ1(t
′
2, t2)u1
(
y(t2), (t
′
1, t
′
2)
)
+ φ1(t
′
2, t
′
2)u1
(
y(t
′
2), (t
′
1, t
′
2)
)
= 3φ1(t2, t2) + 3φ1(t2, t
′
2) + 3φ1(t
′
2, t2) + 3φ1(t
′
2, t
′
2)
whereas
∑
t̃2,t̃
′
2
φ1(t̃2, t̃
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(t̃
′
2), (t
′
1, t̃2)
)
= φ1(t2, t2)u1
(
y
′
(t2), (t
′
1, t2)
)
+ φ1(t2, t
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(t
′
2), (t
′
1, t2)
)
+φ1(t
′
2, t2)u1
(
y
′
(t2), (t
′
1, t
′
2)
)
+ φ1(t
′
2, t
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(t
′
2), (t
′
1, t
′
2)
)
= φ1(t2, t2) + φ1(t2, t
′
2) + 2φ1(t
′
2, t2) + 2φ1(t
′
2, t
′
2).
This implies that for any φ1 ∈ ∆(T2 × T2),
∑
t̃2,t̃
′
2
φ1(t̃2, t̃
′
2)u1
(
y(t̃
′
2), (t
′
1, t̃2)
)
>
∑
t̃2,t̃
′
2
φ1(t̃2, t̃
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(t̃
′
2), (t
′
1, t̃2)
)
.
Thus, the requirement for weak NWR is met.
Third, we consider player 1 of type t
′′
1 . Once again, we define y : T2 → ∆(A) such that
y(t2) = y(t
′
2) = c and y
′
: T2 → ∆(A) such that y
′
(t2) = y
′
(t
′
2) = b. It is straightforward
to confirm that y, y
′
∈ Y w1 [t
′′
1 , f ]. Fix φ1 ∈ ∆(T2 × T2). Now
∑
t̃2,t̃
′
2
φ1(t̃2, t̃
′
2)u1
(
y(t̃
′
2), (t
′′
1 , t̃2)
)
= φ1(t2, t2)u1
(
y(t2), (t
′′
1 , t2)
)
+ φ1(t2, t
′
2)u1
(
y(t
′
2), (t
′′
1 , t2)
)
+φ1(t
′
2, t2)u1
(
y(t2), (t
′′
1 , t
′
2)
)
+ φ1(t
′
2, t
′
2)u1
(
y(t
′
2), (t
′′
1 , t
′
2)
)
= 3φ1(t2, t2) + 3φ1(t2, t
′
2) + 3φ1(t
′
2, t2) + 3φ1(t
′
2, t
′
2)
whereas
∑
t̃2,t̃
′
2
φ1(t̃2, t̃
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(t̃
′
2), (t
′′
1 , t̃2)
)
= φ1(t2, t2)u1
(
y
′
(t2), (t
′′
1 , t2)
)
+ φ1(t2, t
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(t
′
2), (t
′′
1 , t2)
)
+φ1(t
′
2, t2)u1
(
y
′
(t2), (t
′′
1 , t
′
2)
)
+ φ1(t
′
2, t
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(t
′
2), (t
′′
1 , t
′
2)
)
= 2φ1(t
′
2, t2) + 2φ1(t
′
2, t
′
2).
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This implies that for any φ1 ∈ ∆(T2 × T2),
∑
t̃2,t̃
′
2
φ1(t̃2, t̃
′
2)u1
(
y(t̃
′
2), (t
′′
1 , t̃2)
)
>
∑
t̃2,t̃
′
2
φ1(t̃2, t̃
′
2)u1
(
y
′
(t̃
′
2), (t
′′
1 , t̃2)
)
.
Thus, the requirement for weak NWR is satisfied as well.
Fourth, we consider player 2 of type t2. Then we define y : T1 → ∆(A) such that
y(t1) = y(t
′
1) = y(t
′′
1) =
1
2
a+ 1
2
c and y
′
: T1 → ∆(A) such that y
′
(t1) = y
′
(t
′
1) = y(t
′′
1) = b.
It is straightforward to confirm that y, y
′
∈ Y w2 [t2, f ]. Fix φ2 ∈ ∆(T2 × T2). Now
∑
t̃1,t̃
′
1
φ2(t̃1, t̃
′
1)u2(y(t̃
′
1), (t̃1, t2))
= φ2(t1, t1)u2
(
y(t1), (t1, t2)
)
+ φ2(t1, t
′
1)u2
(
y(t
′
1), (t1, t2)
)
+ φ2(t1, t
′′
1)u2(y(t
′′
1), (t1, t2))
+φ2(t
′
1, t1)u2
(
y(t1), (t
′
1, t2)
)
+ φ2(t
′
1, t
′
1)u2
(
y(t
′
1), (t
′
1, t2)
)
+ φ2(t
′
1, t
′′
1)u2(y(t
′′
1), (t
′
1, t2))
+φ2(t
′′
1 , t1)u2
(
y(t1), (t
′′
1 , t2)
)
+ φ2(t
′′
1 , t
′
1)u2
(
y(t
′
1), (t
′′
1 , t2)
)
+ φ2(t
′′
1 , t
′′
1)u2(y(t
′′
1), (t
′′
1 , t2))
= 2(φ1(t1, t1) + φ1(t1, t
′
1) + φ1(t1, t
′′
1)) +
3
2
(φ2(t
′
1, t1) + φ2(t
′
1, t
′
1) + φ2(t
′
1, t
′′
1))
+2(φ2(t
′′
1 , t1) + φ2(t
′′
1 , t
′
1) + φ2(t
′′
1 , t
′′
1)),
whereas
∑
t̃1,t̃
′
1
φ2(t̃1, t̃
′
1)u2(y
′
(t̃
′
1), (t̃1, t2))
= φ2(t1, t1)u2
(
y
′
(t1), (t1, t2)
)
+ φ2(t1, t
′
1)u2
(
y
′
(t
′
1), (t1, t2)
)
+ φ2(t1, t
′′
1)u2(y
′
(t
′′
1), (t1, t2))
+φ2(t
′
1, t1)u2
(
y
′
(t1), (t
′
1, t2)
)
+ φ2(t
′
1, t
′
1)u2
(
y
′
(t
′
1), (t
′
1, t2)
)
+ φ2(t
′
1, t
′′
1)u2(y
′
(t
′′
1), (t
′
1, t2))
+φ2(t
′′
1 , t1)u2
(
y
′
(t1), (t
′′
1 , t2)
)
+ φ2(t
′′
1 , t
′
1)u2
(
y
′
(t
′
1), (t
′′
1 , t2)
)
+ φ2(t
′′
1 , t
′′
1)u2(y
′
(t
′′
1), (t
′′
1 , t2))
= φ2(t
′
1, t1) + φ2(t
′
1, t
′
1) + φ2(t
′
1, t
′′
1).
This implies that for any φ2 ∈ ∆(T1 × T1),
∑
t̃1,t̃
′
1
φ2(t̃1, t̃
′
1)u2(y(t̃
′
1), (t̃1, t2)) >
∑
t̃1,t̃
′
1
φ2(t̃1, t̃
′
1)u2(y
′
(t̃
′
1), (t̃1, t2)).
Thus, the requirement for weak NWR is also met.
And finally, we consider player 2 of type t
′
2. Then we define y : T1 → ∆(A) such that
y(t1) = y(t
′
1) = y(t
′′
1) =
1
2
b+ 1
2
d and y
′
: T1 → ∆(A) such that y
′
(t1) = y
′
(t
′
1) = y(t
′′
1) = c.
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It is straightforward to confirm that y, y
′
∈ Y w2 [t
′
2, f ]. Fix φ2 ∈ ∆(T1 × T1). Then
∑
t̃1,t̃
′
1
φ2(t̃1, t̃
′
1)u2(y(t̃
′
1), (t̃1, t
′
2))
= φ2(t1, t1)u2
(
y(t1), (t1, t
′
2)
)
+ φ2(t1, t
′
1)u2
(
y(t
′
1), (t1, t
′
2)
)
+ φ2(t1, t
′′
1)u2(y(t
′′
1), (t1, t
′
2))
+φ2(t
′
1, t1)u2
(
y(t1), (t
′
1, t
′
2)
)
+ φ2(t
′
1, t
′
1)u2
(
y(t
′
1), (t
′
1, t
′
2)
)
+ φ2(t
′
1, t
′′
1)u2(y(t
′′
1), (t
′
1, t
′
2))
+φ2(t
′′
1 , t1)u2
(
y(t1), (t
′′
1 , t
′
2)
)
+ φ2(t
′′
1 , t
′
1)u2
(
y(t
′
1), (t
′′
1 , t
′
2)
)
+ φ2(t
′′
1 , t
′′
1)u2(y(t
′′
1), (t
′′
1 , t
′
2))
=
3
2
(φ1(t1, t1) + φ1(t1, t
′
1) + φ1(t1, t
′′
1)) +
3
2
(φ2(t
′
1, t1) + φ2(t
′
1, t
′
1) + φ2(t
′
1, t
′′
1))
+2(φ2(t
′′
1 , t1) + φ2(t
′′
1 , t
′
1) + φ2(t
′′
1 , t
′′
1))
whereas
∑
t̃1,t̃
′
1
φ2(t̃1, t̃
′
1)u2(y
′
(t̃
′
1), (t̃1, t
′
2))
= φ2(t1, t1)u2
(
y
′
(t1), (t1, t
′
2)
)
+ φ2(t1, t
′
1)u2
(
y
′
(t
′
1), (t1, t
′
2)
)
+ φ2(t1, t
′′
1)u2(y
′
(t
′′
1), (t1, t
′
2))
+φ2(t
′
1, t1)u2
(
y
′
(t1), (t
′
1, t
′
2)
)
+ φ2(t
′
1, t
′
1)u2
(
y
′
(t
′
1), (t
′
1, t
′
2)
)
+ φ2(t
′
1, t
′′
1)u2(y
′
(t
′′
1), (t
′
1, t
′
2))
+φ2(t
′′
1 , t1)u2
(
y
′
(t1), (t
′′
1 , t
′
2)
)
+ φ2(t
′′
1 , t
′
1)u2
(
y
′
(t
′
1), (t
′′
1 , t
′
2)
)
+ φ2(t
′′
1 , t
′′
1)u2(y
′
(t
′′
1), (t
′′
1 , t
′
2))
= φ2(t1, t1) + φ2(t1, t
′
1) + φ2(t1, t
′′
1).
This implies that for any φ2 ∈ ∆(T1 × T1),
∑
t̃1,t̃
′
1
φ2(t̃1, t̃
′
1)u2(y(t̃
′
1), (t̃1, t
′
2)) >
∑
t̃1,t̃
′
1
φ2(t̃1, t̃
′
1)u2(y
′
(t̃
′
1), (t̃1, t
′
2)).
Thus, the requirement for weak NWR is satisfied.
We therefore conclude that f satisfies weak NWR.
We now show that the SCF f is implementable in interim rationalizable strategies.
Claim 7.6. The SCF f is implementable in interim rationalizable strategies by the canon-
ical mechanism we used in Theorem 6.3.
Proof. We have shown that the SCF f satisfies weak IRM and weak NWR. Thus, by
Theorem 6.3, f is implementable in interim rationalizable strategies by the canonical
mechanism used in the proof of the theorem.
We further claim that there are no mixed Bayesian equilibria in that canonical mech-
anism.
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Claim 7.7. There are no mixed Bayesian equilibria in the canonical mechanism imple-
menting the SCF f used in Theorem 6.3.
Proof. Since the SCF f fails BM, which is a necessary condition for Bayesian implemen-
tation, in particular it cannot be implemented in equilibrium (mixed or pure) by our
canonical mechanism.12 But every strategy profile induced by an equilibrium is rational-
izable. Therefore, if there are any equilibria in the canonical mechanism, their outcome
should be the SCF (because the SCF is implemented in rationalizable strategies). It then
follows that the reason for the failure of implementation in Bayesian equilibrium by the
canonical mechanism is that it does not have any equilibria in mixed or pure strategies.
To illustrate the fact that there are no mixed Bayesian equilibria in the canonical
mechanism, we consider the following strategy profile σ where σi(ti) = (m
1
i , m
2
i , m
3
i , m
4
i ):
• m1i [i] = ti (i.e., each player announces her own type truthfully)
• m11[2] = t2 and m
1
2[1] = t1 (i.e., player 1 always announces t2 as player 2’s type
and player 2 always announces t1 as player 1’s type in the first component of the
message)
• m21 = m
2
2 = 1 (i.e., each player announces 1 in the second component of the message)
By Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 6.3, every rationalizable strategy profile induces
Rule 1. By construction, the strategy profile σ induces Rule 1. In Step 3 of the proof
of Theorem 6.3, each such σi(ti) is rationalizable. However, we argue that the strategy
profile σ does not constitute a Bayesian equilibrium. If this were true, either player 1 of
some type or player 2 of some type has a profitable deviation that triggers Rule 2-1. We
indeed show that type t
′
1 of player 1 has a profitable deviation that triggers Rule 2-1.
Player 1 of type t1 receives the following payoff under σ:
U1(f |t1) = 0.99× 4 + 0.01× 3 = 3.99.
Define y : T2 → ∆(A) such that y(t2) = y(t
′
2) = 0.99× a + 0.01× b. Then, we obtain
U1(y|t1) = 0.99U1(a|t1) + 0.01U1(b|t1) = 0.99× 4 + 0.01× 0.03 = 3.9603 < 3.99,
12See Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989), and Jackson (1991) for the
necessity of BM for implementation in pure Bayesian equilibrium, and Serrano and Vohra (2010) and
Kunimoto (2019) for the necessity of mixed BM for implementation in mixed Bayesian equilibrium. Note
that mixed BM is a strictly stronger condition than BM, as shown in Example 1 of Serrano and Vohra
(2010).
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where U1(a|t1) = 4 and U1(b|t1) = 0.03. This implies that y ∈ Y
∗
1 [t1, f ]. Next, we compute
U1(y|t
′
1) = 0.99U1(a|t
′
1) + 0.01U1(b|t
′
1) = 0.99× 4 + 0.01× 2 = 3.98 > 3 = U1(f |t
′
1),
where U1(a|t
′
1) = 4 and U1(b|t
′
1) = 2. Define m̂1 = (m̂
1
1, m̂
2
1, m̂
3
1, m̂
4
1) as being the same as
σ1(t
′
1) except that we set m
3
1[t1] = y and m̂
2
1 as an integer high enough. Then, m̂1 becomes
type t
′
1’s profitable deviation that triggers Rule 2-1 where player 2 announces m
1
2[1] = t1.
This shows that σ is not an equilibrium.
8 Discussion of Other Issues
In this section, we briefly discuss and raise other questions that are connected to our
work.
8.1 Finite Mechanisms
Bergemann and Morris (2008) shows that, if an SCF f is implementable in rationalizable
strategies by a finite mechanism, it satisfies IRM. Therefore, it follows as a simple corollary
of our Lemma 5.8 that, if an SCF f is implementable in rationalizable strategies by a
finite mechanism, it satisfies BM. It also follows that, if an SCF satisfies weak IRM but
not IRM (as in Example 7.1), the SCF could be implemented in rationalizable strategies,
but the implementing mechanism could never be finite.
For complete information environments, Chen et al. (2020b) characterizes rational-
izable implementation by means of finite mechanisms when lotteries and transfers are
allowed. The characterization is in terms of Maskin monotonicity*, a strenghthening of
Maskin monotonicity.13 Chen et al. (2020a) also shows, in the same environments, that
Maskin monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for Nash implementation in finite mech-
anisms, thereby identifying a class of domains for which rationalizable implementation is
more restrictive than Nash implementation. However, this result does not stand if one
performs robust implementation: as shown in Kunimoto and Saran (2020), using finite
mechanisms, robust implementation in rationalizable strategies and in interim equilibria
are equivalent.
13This condition features in Bergemann et al. (2011) for the rationalizable implementation of SCFs,
albeit allowing general mechanisms.
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8.2 Complete information environments
Example 7.1 shows that rationalizable implementation could be more permissive than
equilibrium implementation. Interestingly, this relation reverses in complete information
environments for SCFs, that is, equilibrium implementation of SCFs is more permissive
than rationalizable implementation in complete information environments. Bergemann et
al. (2011) show that the necessary condition for rationalizable implementation is stronger
than Maskin monotonicity, which is necessary for Nash implementation (Maskin, 1999).
They also give an example of an SCF that is implementable in Nash equilibrium but not in
rationalizable strategies. Xiong (2018) provides a complete characterization of SCFs that
are implementable in rationalizable strategies. For the sufficiency part of the argument,
he constructs a mechanism in which the set of Nash equilibria is nonempty; therefore,
the mechanism implements the SCF both in rationalizable strategies and Nash equilib-
rium. However, we emphasize that the restriction to SCFs is not innocuous. Indeed,
as shown in Kunimoto and Serrano (2019), when it comes to multi-valued social choice
correspondences, rationalizable implementation is more permissive than equilibrium im-
plementation in complete information environments.
9 Concluding Remarks
We have proposed weak interim rationalizable monotonicity (IRM) as a novel condition
and showed that it is a necessary and almost sufficient condition for interim rationalizable
implementation of social choice functions. We also show by means of an example that IRM
and Bayesian monotonicity are not necessary for interim rationalizable implementation.
This suggests that interim rationalizable implementation can be more permissive than
Bayesian implementation. We plan to generalize the findings in this paper to multi-
valued social choice rules, i.e., social choice sets, in a separate paper. We conclude the
paper with mentioning two open questions left for future research.
Double implementation: The foregoing discussion may lead to the question of double
implementation in Bayesian equilibrium and rationalizable strategies. Let BΓ(T ) be the
set of (possibly mixed) Bayesian equilibria in the game Γ(T ). That is,
BΓ(T ) = {σ ∈ Σ| σ constitutes a Bayesian equilibrium of the game Γ(T )} ,
where Σ = Σ1×· · ·×Σn and Σi = {σi| σi : Ti → ∆(Mi)}. Recall that any message profile
that is played by some types in a Bayesian equilibrium is rationalizable for those types.
This leads to the following definition of double implementation:
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Definition 9.1. A mechanism Γ doubly implements an SCF f in Bayesian equilibria
and rationalizable strategies if there exists an SCF f̃ ≈ f such that the following two
conditions hold:
1. Nonemptiness: BΓ(T ) 6= ∅.
2. Uniqueness: for any t ∈ T , m ∈ SΓ(T )(t) implies g(m) = f̂(t).
As we argue in the example of Section 7 that IRM is not necessary for interim ra-
tionalizable implementation and our canonical mechanism exploits the feature that there
are no mixed Bayesian equilibria, one could investigate the connections between IRM and
double implementation.
Responsive SCFs: An SCF f is responsive if, for all i ∈ I and ti, t
′
i ∈ Ti: ti 6= t
′
i ⇒
ti 6∼
f
i t
′
i. Otherwise, f is nonresponsive. Then, for a responsive SCF, one could also
investigate whether weak IRM and IRM are identical conditions. It is possible that the
global inequalities embodied in the definition of responsiveness leave room to translate
weak refutability into strong refutability, which makes weak IRM and IRM equivalent.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 5.5: Pick any deception β that is unacceptable for an SCF f .
(Only-if part) Suppose f satisfies IRM. Then, there exist i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and t
′
i ∈
βi(ti) satisfying t
′
i 6∼
f
i ti such that for all φi ∈ ∆(T−i × T−i) satisfying φi(t−i, t̃−i) >
0 ⇒ t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i) and πi(ti)[t−i] =
∑
t̃−i∈T−i
φi(t−i, t̃−i) for all t−i ∈ T−i, there exists
y ∈
⋂
t̃i∈Ti
Yi[t̃i, f ] such that
∑
t−i,t̃−i
φi(t−i, t̃−i)ui
(
y(t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t̃−i
φi(t−i, t̃−i)ui
(
f(t
′
i, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
We argue that the tuple (i, ti, t
′
i) satisfies the requirement for strong refutability of
β. Pick any belief ψi ∈ ∆(T−i × T ) satisfying ψi(t−i, t̃) > 0 ⇒ t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i) and
πi(ti)[t−i] =
∑
t̃∈T ψi(t−i, t̃) for all t−i ∈ T−i.
Let φ
′
i ∈ ∆(T−i × T−i) be such that, for all t−i, t̃−i ∈ T−i,
φ
′
i(t−i, t̃−i) =
∑
t̃i
ψi(t−i, t̃i, t̃−i).
Then, by construction, φ
′
i(t−i, t̃−i) > 0 ⇒ t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i) and πi(ti)[t−i] =
∑
t̃−i∈T−i
φ
′
i(t−i, t̃−i)
for all t−i ∈ T−i. Therefore, it follows from IRM that there exists y
′
∈
⋂
t̃i∈Ti
Yi[t̃i, f ] such
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that
∑
t−i,t̃−i
φ
′
i(t−i, t̃−i)ui
(
y
′
(t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t̃−i
φ
′
i(t−i, t̃−i)ui
(
f(t
′
i, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
. (7)
Define the SCF f
′
such that f
′
(t̃) = y
′
(t̃−i) for all t̃ ∈ T . Then f
′
(t̃i, ·) = y
′
for all t̃i.
Hence, f
′
is unresponsive to agent i’s type and f
′
(t̃i, ·) ∈ Yi[t̃i, f ] for all t̃i. Moreover, it
follows from (7) that
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f
′
(t̃), (ti, t−i)
)
=
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
y
′
(t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
=
∑
t−i,t̃−i
φ
′
i(t−i, t̃−i)ui
(
y
′
(t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t̃−i
φ
′
i(t−i, t̃−i)ui
(
f(t
′
i, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
=
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f(t
′
i, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
Thus, β is strongly refutable.
(If-part) Suppose that every unacceptable deception for f is strongly refutable. Then,
there exist i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, and t
′
i ∈ βi(ti) satisfying t
′
i 6∼
f
i ti such that for all ψi ∈ ∆(T−i×T )
satisfying ψi(t−i, t̃) > 0 ⇒ t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i) and πi(ti)[t−i] =
∑
t̃∈T ψi(t−i, t̃) for all t−i ∈ T−i,
there exists an SCF f
′
such that f
′
is unresponsive to agent i’s type, f
′
(t̃i, ·) ∈ Yi[t̃i, f ]
for all t̃i ∈ Ti, and
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f
′
(t̃), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t̃
ψi(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f(t
′
i, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
We argue that the tuple (i, ti, t
′
i) satisfies the requirement in IRM for deception β. Pick
any belief φi ∈ ∆(T−i × T−i) satisfying φi(t−i, t̃−i) > 0 ⇒ t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i) and πi(ti)[t−i] =
∑
t̃−i∈T−i
φi(t−i, t̃−i) for all t−i ∈ T−i.
Let ψ
′
i ∈ ∆(T−i × T ) be such that ψ
′
i(t−i, t̃) = 0 whenever t̃i 6= ti and ψ
′
i(t−i, t̃) =
φi(t−i, t̃−i) whenever t̃i = ti. Then, by construction, ψ
′
i(t−i, t̃) > 0 ⇒ t̃−i ∈ β−i(t−i) and
πi(ti)[t−i] =
∑
t̃∈T ψ
′
i(t−i, t̃) for all t−i ∈ T−i. Therefore, it follows from strong refutability
of β that there exists an SCF f
′′
such that f
′′
is unresponsive to agent i’s type, f
′′
(t̃i, ·) ∈
Yi[t̃i, f ] for all t̃i ∈ Ti, and
∑
t−i,t̃
ψ
′
i(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f
′′
(t̃), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t̃
ψ
′
i(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f(t
′
i, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
. (8)
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Define the mapping y : T−i → ∆(A) such that y(t̃−i) = f
′′
(ti, t̃−i) for all t̃−i ∈ T−i. Since
f
′′
is unresponsive to agent i’s type, we have y = f
′′
(t̃i, ·) for all t̃i. Hence, y = f
′′
(t̃i, ·) ∈
Yi[t̃i, f ] for all t̃i ∈ Ti. That is, y ∈
⋂
t̃i∈Ti
Yi[t̃i, f ]. Moreover, it follows from (8) that
∑
t−i,t̃−i
φi(t−i, t̃−i)ui
(
y(t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
=
∑
t−i,t̃
ψ
′
i(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f
′′
(t̃), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t̃
ψ
′
i(t−i, t̃)ui
(
f(t
′
i, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
=
∑
t−i,t̃−i
φi(t−i, t̃−i)ui
(
f(t
′
i, t̃−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
Thus, f satisfies IRM.
Proof of Lemma 6.2: We prove separate proofs of the two statements in the lemma.
We prove (a) first. Suppose an SCF f satisfies weak NWR. Pick any i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti,
and φi ∈ ∆(T−i × T−i).
First, it follows from the definition of weak NWR that there exists ỹ ∈ Y wi [ti, f ] such
that Ui(f |ti) > Ui(ỹ|ti). To see this, consider the belief φ̃i such that φ̃i(t−i, t
′
−i) = 0
whenever t
′
−i 6= t−i and φ̃i(t−i, t
′
−i) = πi(ti)[t−i] whenever t
′
−i = t−i. Then, there must
exist ỹ, ỹ
′
∈ Y wi [ti, f ] such that
Ui(f |ti) ≥ Ui(ỹ
′
|ti) =
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φ̃i(t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
ỹ
′
(t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t
′′
−i
φ̃i(t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
ỹ(t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
= Ui(ỹ|ti),
where the first weak inequality follows from the fact that ỹ
′
∈ Y wi [ti, f ] and the strict
inequality follows from weak NWR.
Second, since f satisfies weak NWR, there exist y, y
′
∈ Y wi [ti, f ] such that
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φi(t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
y(t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φi(t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
y
′
(t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
Pick any ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and define yǫ : T−i → ∆(A) such that y
ǫ(t−i) = (1− ǫ)y(t−i) + ǫỹ(t−i)
for all t−i ∈ T−i. We similarly define y
′ǫ. By construction, yǫ and y
′ǫ are such that
Ui(f |ti) > Ui(y
ǫ|ti) and Ui(f |ti) > Ui(y
′ǫ|ti).
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For ǫ sufficiently close to 1, we have
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φi(t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
yǫ(t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φi(t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
y
′ǫ(t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
We fix any such sufficiently large ǫ.
Third, since ∆∗(A) is a dense subset of ∆(A), for each t−i, there exists a sequence
of lotteries {ℓz(t−i)}
∞
z=1 ∈ ∆
∗(A) converging to yǫ(t−i). For each z ≥ 1, define y
z :
T−i → ∆
∗(A) such that yz(t−i) = ℓ
z(t−i) for all t−i ∈ T−i. Similarly, we can define
y
′z : T−i → ∆
∗(A) such that y
′z(t−i) converges to y
′ǫ(t−i) for all t−i ∈ T−i. As T−i is
finite, there exists a sufficiently large integer z such that
Ui(f |ti) > Ui(y
z|ti) and Ui(f |ti) > Ui(y
′z|ti).
and
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φi(t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
yz(t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φi(t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
y
′z(t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
. (9)
The first set of inequalities imply that yz, y
′z ∈ Y ∗i [ti, f ].
Lastly, since yti,fi , by construction, assigns a positive weight to all y ∈ Y
∗
i [ti, f ], if,
contrary to what we want to establish, we had
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φi(t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
yti,fi (t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
≥
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φi(t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
y(t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
, ∀y ∈ Y ∗i [ti, f ],
then it must be that
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φi(t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
yz(t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
=
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φi(t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
y
′z(t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
,
which contradicts (9).
We prove (b) next. Suppose that an SCF f satisfies weak NWR. Pick any i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti,
and z1i ∈ ∆(T−i). As ᾱ assigns a positive weight to all a ∈ A, if
∑
t−i
z1i (t−i)ui
(
ᾱ, (ti, t−i)
)
≥
∑
t−i
z1i (t−i)ui
(
a, (ti, t−i)
)
, ∀a ∈ A,
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then it must be that
∑
t−i
z1i (t−i)ui
(
a, (ti, t−i)
)
=
∑
t−i
z1i (t−i)ui
(
a
′
, (ti, t−i)
)
,
for all a, a
′
∈ A. Now consider the belief φ̃i ∈ ∆(T−i×T−i) such that φ̃i(t−i, t−i) = z
1
i (t−i)
for all t−i ∈ T−i. Then, by weak NWR, there must exist ỹ, ỹ
′
∈ Y wi [ti, f ] such that
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φ̃i(t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
ỹ(t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
>
∑
t−i,t
′
−i
φ̃i(t−i, t
′
−i)ui
(
ỹ
′
(t
′
−i), (ti, t−i)
)
.
But the left-hand side of the above inequality equals
∑
t−i
z1i (t−i)ui
(
ỹ(t−i), (ti, t−i)
)
, while
the right-hand side equals
∑
t−i
z1i (t−i)ui
(
ỹ
′
(t−i), (ti, t−i)
)
, which contradicts the fact that
type ti is indifferent over all alternatives when she holds the belief z
1
i .
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